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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920458-CA
Priority No. 2

STEVEN ASHLEY ROGERS,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Supp.) provides
this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first degree
felony criminal conviction from the district court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did Detective Willden violate Article I section 14 of
the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution in forcing open the front door to Mr. Rogers' home
during the course of a warrantless drug investigation?
2. Was the search warrant invalid because it was obtained
by the use of evidence garnered through the violation of Mr. Rogers*
Fourth Amendment and Article I section 14 rights?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, this Court normally defers to the trial court's findings
of fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard, and reviews legal

conclusions without deference for correctness.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781-782 n.3 (Utah 1991).

E.g. State v.
Because the trial

court never articulated his analysis on the record in any way prior
to signing the findings and conclusions created by the prosecutor,
the findings are entitled to less deference than normally would be
due.

See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d

1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cited with
approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah
1990).

See also State v. Mirquet. Case No. 920066-CA, (Utah App.

slip opinion filed December 30, 1992) at 8 n.4.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Appendix 1 of this brief contains the full text of the
following controlling constitutional provisions:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14
United States Constitution, Amendment IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Mr. Rogers with four counts of possession
of a controlled substance (R. 7-10).

Trial counsel filed a motion

to suppress evidence seized in violation of Mr. Rogers7 rights
guaranteed by Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
(R. 28). Trial counsel challenged both the warrantless entry into
Mr. Rogers7 home, and the warrant obtained as a result of evidence
gained during the warrantless entry (R. 36-61).
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After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court took the
motion under advisement, allowing the parties to submit additional
memoranda (R. 209-210).

A minute entry dated May 15, 1992 indicates

that the court would rule on the motion on May 18, 1992 (R. 79), but
there is no minute entry for May 18, 1992. At a hearing on May 20,
1992, trial counsel indicated his understanding that the trial court
had denied the motion to suppress (R. 213), but the record does not
indicate how trial counsel learned this.

The State dismissed three

of the counts, and the trial court entered a conviction for one
count of possession on the basis of stipulated facts (R. 213-219).
At this hearing, the court noted that the court was in the process
of preparing his findings of fact relating to the denial of the
motion to suppress, and allowed Mr. Rogers the opportunity to
nullify the conviction based on stipulated facts in the event that
trial counsel was dissatisfied with the courts findings of fact (R.
216-217).
At the sentencing hearing on July 10, 1992, trial counsel
and the prosecutor submitted separate proposed findings and
conclusions (R. 108). The trial court indicated that he would
evaluate them and perhaps prepare his own (R. 108). The trial court
allowed trial counsel to withdraw from representing Mr. Rogers at
the sentencing hearing on July 10, 1992, and appointed the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association to represent Mr. Rogers on appeal (R.
91).

On July 15, 1992, the trial court signed the findings crafted

by the prosecutor, without ever having previously articulated the
court's findings and conclusions (R. 101-106).
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The trial court sentenced Mr. Rogers to a prison term of
zero to five years, and suspended that sentence, placing Mr. Rogers
on probation for three years (R. 93-94).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The prosecutor's findings of fact which the trial court
signed are copied in appendix 2 and state:
1. On December 2, 1991, Metro Narcotics
Officers Steve Willden and Kevin Judd went to
Defendant's home to investigate an anonymous
"tip" in which the caller indicated that a man
named "Steve", residing at 1935 South 900 East,
was dealing in large quantities of marijuana and
there were large amounts in the residence at the
time.
2. As they were searching for a place to
park their vehicle, the police officers saw two
males and one female, one of them wearing
clothing consistent with gang membership, enter
the residence.
3. Upon arriving at Defendant's residence,
the officers, Willden and Judd, identified
themselves and asked to come inside and speak
with Defendant who identified himself as "Steve."
4. The Defendant told the officers that they
could not enter the home and the Defendant
stepped outside onto the porch to speak with them.
5. When the officers asked the Defendant for
identification so they could write their report,
Defendant said it was inside the residence and he
would have to go inside to get it.
6. The officers asked Defendant to leave the
door open for their safety while he went inside
and Defendant agreed to leave the door open.
7. Based on their training and experience in
narcotics enforcement, the officers were
concerned about weapons in the house because
people who deal in narcotics are often armed.
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8. During the conversation on the porch,
Defendant appeared nervous and upset and each
time that he went through the door, he opened it
only enough to slip in or out. While on the
porch, Defendant kept the door closed.
9. After Defendant slipped inside the
residence, he began closing the door.
10. At that time, Detective Willden put his
hand on the door to keep it from closing and
reminded Defendant that he had agreed to keep the
door open, thinking that the Defendant had
forgotten.
11. At the point in time at which Willden
used his hand to keep the door from closing, he
smelled the odor of marijuana coming from within
the residence.
12. After Detective Willden smelled what he
suspected from his training and experience to be
marijuana coming from within the residence, he
pushed the door open and stepped inside to secure
the individuals who might be there and to prevent
the destruction of evidence.
13. When the officers entered the residence,
they explained to Defendant that they could smell
marijuana and they again asked for permission to
search the residence. The Defendant denied the
request.
14. Detective Judd called for backup help from
other officers and when they arrived, Judd and
Willden went to obtain a search warrant based
upon the information obtained from the anonymous
phone call, the verification of the individual
named Steve at the described location, and the
odor of marijuana.
15. Upon returning with a Search Warrant,
the officers found approximately four pounds of
marijuana, as well as other items connected to
the sale of marijuana, and arrested the Defendant.
The trial court's conclusions of law indicate,
1. The initial entry occurred when Detective
Willden placed his hand on the door to prevent
it's closing and this entry was a reasonable
entry.
-5 -

2. The intrusion into the privacy of
Defendant's home was minimal and was justified by
the officers7 concern for their safety based on
their observations of the individual who had
previously entered the home, their experience
with individuals who deal in narcotics being
armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into the home
possibly alerting other individuals to police
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons.
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the
officers believed the Defendant had agreed to
leave the door open and had forgotten to do so in
his nervousness.
4. The odor of marijuana was detected by
Detective Willden while he was in a location
where he had a right to be, i.e. the front porch
with one hand preventing the full closing of
Defendant's door.
5. The second entry into the home occurred
when Detectives Judd and Willden went inside to
secure the premises. There was no information
obtained as a result of that entry that was used
to provide probable cause for the Search Warrant.
6. The Search Warrant was valid, being
supported by legally obtained evidence which
provided probable cause to search the residence.
7. All of the evidence being offered by the
State was legally obtained, without a violation
of Defendant's rights under either Section 14 of
Article I of the Constitution of Utah, nor under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
8. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied
and all of the State's evidence is admissible.
The facts in this case were provided by the testimony of
two police officers, Detective Willden and Detective Judd.

The

detectives' versions of events coincided in some respects, but
diverged in others.
the case.

Two examples illustrate the unsettled facts of

Detective Willden initially testified that he smelled the

marijuana after he placed his hand on the door, when Mr. Rogers was
-6 -

resisting Willden's opening of the door (R. 135). Willden later
testified that by resisting, he meant that Rogers was trying to shut
his door, but not while Willden had his hand on the door (R.
160-161)•

In contrast, Detective Judd testified that he moved

forward on Mr. Rogers' porch because he thought there would be a
"physical confrontation" between Detective Willden and Mr. Rogers
(R. 179), and testified that there was a struggle between Detective
Willden and Mr. Rogers to determine if the door would be opened or
shut (R. 185-186).

Judd testified that it was during the struggle

that Willden claimed to smell the marijuana (R. 187). Detective
Willden testified that prior to approaching Mr. Rogers7 home, the
officers witnessed three people, one of them wearing purported gang
clothing, park a car in Mr. Rogers' driveway and enter the house (R.
129-130).

Judd, on the other hand, did not see anyone going into

the house prior to the officers' approach (R. 175).
Given the fact sensitive nature of all search and seizure
cases, and the unresolved facts of this case, it is particularly
problematic that the trial court never stated his assessment of the
facts on the record prior to simply signing off on the prosecutor's
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

See Automatic Control

Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah
1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cited with approval in State v.
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).

See also

State v. Mirouet. Case No. 920066-CA, (Utah App. slip opinion filed
December 30, 1992) at 8 n.4.
The following additional facts were not addressed by the
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prosecutor's findings which were adopted by the trial court, but are
undisputed in the record and necessary to this Court's assessment of
this case:
1. Detective Willden testified at the
preliminary hearing, but would not admit at
trial, that the smell he recognized while he was
forcing open Mr. Rogers' door was the smell of
unburned marijuana (R. 163-165).
2. All of the unburned marijuana found in
Mr. Rogers' home was stored in ziplock baggies in
locations remote from the door pushed open by
Detective Willden (R. 142-159).
3. Detective Judd could not smell marijuana
until after he entered Mr. Rogers' home (R. 180,
185) .
4. In testifying under oath before the trial
court, Willden admitted that he smelled marijuana
after Willden forced the door open, when Mr.
Rogers was resisting Willden's opening of the
door (R. 135-136). Willden later testified that
by resisting, he meant that Rogers was trying to
shut his door, but not while Willden had his hand
on the door (R. 160-161). Judd also testified
that it was during a struggle between Mr. Rogers
and Detective Willden that Willden claimed to
smell the marijuana (R. 179, 185-186).
5. In the affidavit used to obtain the
search warrant, Willden alleged that he smelled
marijuana when Rogers opened the door to Rogers'
home. Search Warrant Affidavit, page 2, in
appendix 4 to this brief.
6. At the hearing on the motion to
suppress, Willden testified that he forced open
the door because Mr. Rogers' unwillingness to let
the detectives into his home made Willden
nervous, because Willden perceived a danger
because drug dealers are frequently armed,
because he had seen a person wearing "gang"
clothing enter Mr. Rogers' home, and because he
thought that Mr. Rogers had forgotten to leave
the door open (R. 130, 134, 135, 136, 161, 163).
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7. In the affidavit used to obtain the
search warrant, Willden made no mention of any
perceived danger prompting him to force open the
door, and made no mention of forcing open the
door. He alleged that he smelled the marijuana
when Mr. Rogers opened the door to his home.
Search Warrant Affidavit, page 2, in appendix 4
to this brief.
8. While Detective Willden testified that he
requested and forced open Mr. Rogers' door for
safety purposes, upon entering the house
containing at least four people, one of whom was
wearing purported gang clothing, neither officer
drew his gun, frisked any of the occupants of Mr.
Rogers' home, or conducted a protective sweep (R.
136-138, 167, 180-181).
9. Willden simply announced that he could
smell marijuana and again asked Mr. Rogers to
consent to the search of his home (R. 137).
10. Upon receiving Mr. Rogers' repeated
refusal to consent to the search, Detective
Willden conducted no safety-related measures, but
sent Detective Judd to the police car to call for
backup while a warrant was obtained and had the
four occupants of Mr. Rogers' home move from the
dining room to the adjoining front room (R.
137-138, 180-181).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In finding the initial warrantless entry into Mr. Rogers'
home legal, the trial court erred as a matter of law.

The trial

court's ruling turns on the conclusion that the initial entry into
Mr. Rogers' home was "reasonable."

The trial court accepted the

State's argument that the entry into Mr. Rogers' home was akin to a
level two Terry stop, and should be evaluated for reasonableness.
This analysis overlooks fundamental law that in order to enter a
home, police must have a warrant, or both probable cause and true
exigent circumstances which are not created by the police as a ruse
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to evade the warrant requirement.
The officers in the instant case had no warrant, no
probable cause, and no reasonable suspicion.

There were no exigent

circumstances here, only a hollow claim of danger made by Detective
Willden.

The officers7 failure to follow through on any safety

measures upon breaking into Mr. Rogers7 home belies the claim that
the entry was prompted by concerns of danger to the officers.

In

signing under oath the search warrant affidavit, Willden claimed no
exigent circumstances justifying his forcing open the door to Mr.
Rogers7 home, and omitted any mention of Willden7s forcing open the
door.

This further illustrates the mendacity of Willden7s belated

claims of exigent circumstances.
When the evidence gleaned from the initial illegal entry of
Mr. Rogers7 home and/or Willden7s misrepresentations are properly
redacted from the search warrant affidavit, there is no probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant.

All evidence gained by the

illegal entry and search following the issuance of the warrant
should be suppressed.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. ROGERS7 HOME
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I SECTION 14.
A. PROBABLE CAUSE, NOT REASONABLENESS, IS THE STANDARD THAT MUST BE
MET TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. ROGERS7 HOME.
Warrantless searches of homes are presumptively
unreasonable; to make a legal warrantless entry of a home, police
must have probable cause and exigent circumstances.
-10-

It is the

State's burden to justify the presumptively unreasonable warrantless
entry of a home.
(1984).

See Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 748-750

When police are making arrests for non-violent and minor

offenses, the government bears a heavier burden to establish exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into a home.

Welsh at

750-753.
As this Court explained in State v. Northrup.

756 P.2d

1288 (Utah App. 1988),
"[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed." The warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment, which is imposed on agents of
the government who seek to enter a home for
purposes of search or arrest, is the "principal
protection against unnecessary intrusions into
private dwellings." Thus, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized, as a basic
principle, that "searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable." "Only in a 'few specifically and
well-delineated' situations, may a warrantless
search of a dwelling withstand constitutional
scrutiny, even though the authorities have
probable cause to conduct it." The State has the
burden of proving that "the exigencies of the
situation made [the search] imperative."
State v. Northrup. 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988)(brackets by this
Court; citations omitted).

The expectation of privacy in the home

recognized by the law is so strong that it emanates from the home to
the surrounding areas:
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the
'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life,7 and therefore has been considered part of
the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Thus, court have extended Fourth Amendment
protection to the curtilage; and they have
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defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by
reference to the factors that determine whether
an individual reasonably may expect that an area
immediately adjacent to the home will remain
private.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)(citation
omitted).

As the Court stated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573

(1980),
Almost a century ago the Court stated in
resounding terms that the principles reflected in
the Amendment "reached farther than the concrete
form" of the specific cases that gave it birth,
and "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life."
Id. at 585 (citation omitted).
In disregard of the historical recognition of the sanctity
of the home, the trial court adopted the prosecutor's analogy to a
level two Terry stop, reasoning that because the entry of Mr.
Rogers' home was a "minimal intrusion," it was legal if it was
"reasonable," rather than justified by probable cause.

The legal

conclusions state, in relevant part,
1. The initial entry occurred when Detective
Willden placed his hand on the door to prevent
it's closing and this entry was a reasonable
entry.
2. The intrusion into the privacy of
Defendant's home was minimal and was justified by
the officers' concern for their safety based on
their observations of the individual who had
previously entered the home, their experience
with individuals who deal in narcotics being
armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into the home
possibly alerting other individuals to police
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons.
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the
officers believed the Defendant had agreed to
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leave the door open and had forgotten to do so in
his nervousness.
This analysis of the trial court was legally incorrect.
Because the officers were intruding into a home, probable cause, not
reasonableness, was the governing standard.

A well reasoned and

detailed opinion, United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir.
1988)(en banc), explains the trial court's error in applying a
reasonableness/balancing standard to the entry of a home.
Winsor is in appendix 3 to this brief.

A copy of

In a nutshell, for purposes

of Fourth Amendment analysis, the less demanding
reasonableness/balancing test applies only in circumstances wherein
there is a low expectation of privacy.

Because the home enjoys

perhaps the highest expectation of privacy universally recognized in
fourth amendment jurisprudence, the reasonableness/balancing test
does not apply.

No intrusion into a home, however minimal, is legal

unless it is supported by probable cause.

See Winsor. 846 F.2d

1569, 1573-1579.
For purposes of Article I section 14, the
reasonableness/balancing test applied by the trial court was an
incorrect legal standard.

As the main opinion explained in State v.

Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)(plurality), in Utah, once an
expectation of privacy is established, Article I section 14 applies
and requires both a showing of probable cause and exigent
circumstances in order to justify a warrantless search.

The main

Larocco opinion explicitly details confusing federal law wherein the
probable cause standard and the reasonableness/balancing test are
inconsistently applied, and opts for the probable cause standard
-13-

under the Utah Constitution.

Id. at 467-471.

Given the high

expectation of privacy that Utahns enjoy in their homes, the
probable cause and exigent circumstance standard must apply under
Article I section 14.

The trial court's application of the lower

reasonableness/balancing test was legally incorrect.
If the probable cause and exigent circumstances
requirements were watered down to the reasonableness balancing test
applied by the trial court, it would essentially leave the sanctity
of the home in the discretion of the police, in contravention of
fundamental constitutional principles.

As the Court explained in

Pavton. supra,
"Crime, even in the privacy of one's own
quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to
society, and the law allows such crime to be
reached on the proper showing. The right of
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also
a grave concern, not only to the individual but
to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent."
Id. at 586 n.24 (citation omitted).
The trial court's analysis that the "minimal intrusion" was
legal because it was reasonable was also based on the trial court's
failure to recognize that Detective Willden's entry of Mr. Rogers'
home was a search and seizure requiring probable cause and exigent
circumstances.

In United States v. Winsor. 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir.

1988)(en banc), police officers went door to door in a hotel,
demanding that the residents open their doors during the officers'
search for a potentially armed bank robber.
-14-

Id. at 1571. On

appeal, the government contended that when the officers demanded
that the door to Mr, Winsor's room be opened and Mr. Winsor
complied, no search occurred because the officers did not actually
enter the room.

Id. at 1572.

Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals disagreed, stating, "To draw a distinction based
upon whether there had been a physical entry into the premises would
enable police officers to evade the reach of the Fourth Amendment
simply by forcing a door open and visually examining the interior
without crossing the threshold.

That the officers gained visual

access to the interior of a dwelling without physically entering it
is irrelevant to the question whether a search was effected."

Id.

at 1572.
Of course, here, Detective Willden went beyond the search
conducted by the officers in Winsor, and actually crossed the
threshold of Mr. Rogers7 door when he forced it open.

Thus, the

officer violated the Fourth Amendment right described in Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), as follows:
"A man can still control a small part of his
environment, his house; he can retreat thence
from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they
cannot get at him without disobeying the
Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of
liberty — worth protecting from encroachment. A
sane, decent, civilized society must provide some
such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny,
some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some
inviolate place which is a man's castle."
Id. at 512 n.4 (citation omitted).

Just as the officers in

Silverman breached the Fourth Amendment by eavesdropping by means of
a device intruding into Mr. Silverman's home, the officers in this
case breached the Fourth Amendment when Willden forced open the door
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of Mr. Rogers7 home.
Additional cases demonstrate that Detective Willden's
conduct constituted a search and seizure requiring probable cause
and exigent circumstances.

E.g. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.

705, 712 (1984)("A 'search7 occurs 'when an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.' . . .
A 'seizure' of property occurs when 'there is some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in the
property.'")(citations omitted); United States v. Place. 462 U.S
696, 704-706 (1983)(seizures of personal property may be justified
with less than probable cause, depending on the extent of intrusion
on Fourth Amendment interests; searches must be supported by
probable cause).

See also State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1136

(Utah 1989)(when officer opened passenger door to car, this
constituted a search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967)(police conducted a search and seizure when they monitored
private phone conversations in public telephone booth by means of
equipment that did not penetrate the booth); Hernandez v. United
States, 353 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir.)(when officer squeezed luggage
to smell suspected marijuana in escaping air, officer conducted a
search), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); United States v.
Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-1367 (2nd Cir. 1985)(because of high
expectation of privacy in the home, canine sniff of apartment, in
contrast to canine sniff of luggage at airport, constituted a
search), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985).

-16-

B. THERE WAS NO WARRANT, PROBABLE CAUSE, OR REASONABLE SUSPICION OF
CRIME TO JUSTIFY DETECTIVE WILLDEN#S ENTRY INTO MR. ROGERS' HOME.
Because the trial court mistakenly believed that the search
of Mr. Rogers' home was legal if it was reasonable, rather than
supported by probable cause and required by exigent circumstances,
the trial court made no findings or conclusions as to probable cause.
The officers here had no reasonable suspicion that a crime
was occurring, let alone probable cause.

The anonymous telephone

caller apparently gave no information other than that a person named
Steve was dealing large quantities of marijuana from a gray house at
the stated address (R. 129, 175). This did not support a reasonable
suspicion, and certainly did not justify a warrantless search of Mr.
Rogers' home.

See Alabama v. White. 496 U.S. 325 (1990)(reasonable

suspicion was established by anonymous tip, which accurately
predicted the details of Ms. White's future conduct, and reflected
the tipster's familiarity with Ms. White); Recznik v. City of
Lorain. 393 U.S. 166, 169-170 (1968)("Even where a search warrant is
obtained, the police must show a basis for the search beyond the
mere fact of an assertion of by an informer.

At least as much is

required to support a search without a warrant.")(citations
omitted).

Mr. Rogers' nervous behavior and exercise of his right to

privacy in his home do not indicate a reasonable suspicion that he
was in possession of drugs.

See State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85,

89-90 (Utah App. 1987)(nervousness in police encounters does not
support reasonable suspicion); State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 494
and n.ll (Utah App. 1990)(citizen aversion of police contact does
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not give rise to a reasonable suspicion).

Failing to provide a

reasonable suspicion, these factors fall short of establishing
probable cause.

C. THERE WERE NO GENUINE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
The trial court approved of Willden's forcing open Mr.
Rogers' door, reasoning that it was "reasonable" in light of the
officers' fear of the person wearing a Raiders hat, black jacket and
black tee shirt, who entered Mr. Rogers' home, and fear of the
possibility that Mr. Rogers was an armed drug dealer.

In contrast

to the conclusion that Detective Willden's action was justified by
fear of Mr. Rogers' intentions toward the officers, the trial court
also found that Willden's actions were justified because Willden
reasonably believed that Rogers had simply forgotten his agreement
to leave open the door.

His conclusions state, in relevant part,

2. The intrusion into the privacy of
Defendant's home was minimal and was justified by
the officers' concern for their safety based on
their observations of the individual who had
previously entered the home, their experience
with individuals who deal in narcotics being
armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into the home
possibly alerting other individuals to police
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons.
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the
officers believed the Defendant had agreed to
leave the door open and had forgotten to do so in
his nervousness.
Here again, the trial court applied the incorrect
reasonableness/balancing standard, in finding that exigent
circumstances justified the search of Mr. Rogers' home.

In order to

justify a warrantless search of a home, the State must show not only
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probable cause that a crime has been committed, but also "at least
probable cause" that exigent circumstances existed.
Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).

Minnesota v.

See also State v. Northrup. 756

P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah App. 1988)("The State has the burden of
proving that 'the exigencies of the situation made [the search]
imperative.")(brackets by the Court; citation omitted).

While

danger to the police is an exigent circumstance recognized under
Fourth Amendment law, jLd., the danger to the police in the instant
case did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, let alone to
the requisite level: "at least probable cause."
Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85 (1979), demonstrates this
point.

In Ybarra. the police went to a tavern to execute a valid

search warrant for the tavern and a bartender named Greg.

The

warrant was based on probable cause that drugs would be found.
at 87-88.

Id.

In executing the warrant, the officers began by

performing a Terry frisk on the bar patrons, which led an officer to
eventually discover some heroine on one of the patrons, Mr. Ybarra.
Id. at 88-89.

In seeking to justify the warrantless search of Mr.

Ybarra, the government argued that the Terry frisk was justified as
a reasonable frisk for weapons.

Id. at 93. After noting that Mr.

Ybarra was not acting in a threatening manner and was wearing a
jacket that many tavern patrons wear, the Court found that there was
no reasonable basis to justify the Terry frisk.

Id. at 93.

Assuming arguendo that it is proper to infer that drug
dealers are armed and prone to confronting police with weapons,
because the detectives had no reasonable suspicion that Mr. Rogers
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was dealing drugs, there is nothing to support a reasonable
suspicion that he posed a threat to the officers. Assuming that
Detective Willden did see three people enter Mr. Rogers7 home, and
that one of those people was wearing a Raiders hat and a black tee
shirt and jacket, this did not support a reasonable suspicion that
the officers faced a danger when they were standing on Mr. Rogers7
front porch.

Raiders hats and black tee shirts and jackets are

common, and just as likely to indicate that the person wearing the
hat is a member of or a fan of a football team, or following a
juvenile fashion trend, as to support an inference that the wearer
is armed and dangerous.

Given that the facts of this case would not

have supported a Terry frisk under Ybarra. it can hardly be argued
that the facts provide at least probable cause to believe that the
entry of Mr. Rogers' home was justified by a danger to the officers.
More importantly, the facts of this case demonstrate that
it was the desire to investigate, and not the desire to protect the
police, that led Detective Willden to force open the door of Mr.
Rogers7 home.1

Law governing the exigent circumstances doctrine,

1. The trial court7s findings of fact indicating that
Detective Willden blocked open the door because he was concerned
about dangers to the officers posed by Mr. Rogers and the occupants
of his home are clearly erroneous, in that they were induced by an
incorrect view of the law. See State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 766
(Utah App. 1990)("A finding is clearly erroneous if it is without
adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of
the law.11). As previously discussed, the trial court applied the
wrong legal standard (reasonableness) in finding exigent
circumstances. Further, the trial court simply took Detective
Willden7s claim of exigent circumstances at face value, without
evaluating all of the facts and circumstances surrounding Willden7s
actual conduct. As the following discussion of law demonstrates,
(footnote continues)
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which law was apparently overlooked by the trial court, requires
courts to look beyond claims of exigent circumstances to the
comprehensive facts of the case.

An officer's mere incantation of

"exigent circumstances" is not dispositive of that issue if his
actual conduct belies the claim.

fl

[I]f the officers act in a manner

inconsistent with a motive to preserve life or property, the
warrantless entry or search cannot be justified after the fact by
employing the exigent circumstances doctrine."

People v. Duncan,

720 P.2d 2, 10 (Cal. 1986).
For example, in United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954 (10th
Cir. 1987), police officers executed a valid arrest warrant,

(footnote 1 continued)
law governing the exigent circumstances doctrine requires courts to
look beyond a simple claim of exigent circumstances.
Because the trial court's findings were drafted by counsel
and adopted by the court in the complete absence of the trial
court's ever articulating the court's resolution of the facts, the
findings are entitled to less deference on appeal than would
normally be due. See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech,
Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring),
cited with approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343,
1347 (Utah 1990) . See also State v. Mircruet, Case No. 920066-CA,
(Utah App. slip opinion filed December 30, 1992) at 8 n.4. The
deficiencies in the findings, stemming from the trial court's
failure to state his findings, and from the trial court's inaccurate
view of the law, should alleviate the need to marshall the evidence
in challenging the findings. See Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,
477-478 (Utah App. 1991)(marshalling requirement does not apply when
findings are legally insufficient).
Assuming arguendo that the marshalling requirement does
apply, Detective Willden's testimony that he believed that he was in
danger (R. 130, 134, 136, 161, 163) is the evidence that supports
the trial court's findings. However, Willden's testimony is legally
insufficient to sustain the findings, because under the governing
law, the facts and circumstances demonstrate that Detective Willden
was not prompted to force his way into Mr. Rogers' home by concerns
for safety of the detectives.
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handcuffing Mr. Bonitz in his home and taking him into custody when
his parents were present, and then proceeded to search his bedroom
for two and a half hours.

Id. at 955.

In sifting through the

governments numerous attempts to justify the warrantless search,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had this to say in response to
the claim of exigent circumstances:
Even though the trial court accepted the
exigent circumstances justification, the record
simply does not support such a conclusion. The
witness who identified the black powder testified
that it was the type legally and routinely seen
in bullet reloading shops in quantities "up to
maybe ten" cans. Standing undisturbed, cans of
gun powder are inert, whether in a gun reloading
shop or in a home. Similarly, the hand grenade
paperweight was not illegal and, even when live,
a grenade is not dangerous unless disturbed.
Thus, the only immediate danger that existed was
created by the officers themselves when they
entered the secure area and began to handle these
materials.
The Government's claim that they believed
exigent circumstances were present smacks of pure
unadulterated pretext. The prolonged
inventory-type search required a total of
approximately two hours, long enough to examine
books and manuals one page at a time. Officers
other than the bomb technician remained in or
about the room throughout the search. Even more
significant, the officers made no attempt to
remove defendant's parents from the home even
though they now have the audacity to claim that
the danger was such to threaten a restaurant some
distance away. Similarly, at no time during this
prolonged search were neighboring residences or
business establishments evacuated or warned that
the risk of an explosion existed. In view of
their lack of concern for their own safety and
that of others, we are unconvinced that the
officers apprehended an emergency which justified
this extensive examination of a room without a
search warrant.
Id. at 957-958 (court's record citations omitted).
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Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have previously
rejected claims of exigent circumstances when the officers' conduct
revealed an investigatory purpose.

State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d

1288, 1291-1292 (Utah App. 1988)(trial court's findings of exigent
circumstances reversed because record demonstrated no exigent
circumstances); State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah
1989)(officer opened passenger car door and smelled marijuana smoke
and saw marijuana; because his conduct and testimony reflected an
investigative intent, rather than fear for his safety, the court
held that the evidence should have been suppressed).

This Court has

previously recognized that in assessing warrantless searches based
on exigent circumstances, the scope of the search should be
"'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justif[ied] its
initiation.'"

State v. Pursifell. 751 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App.

1988)(citation omitted).

The scope of the search in the instant

case demonstrates that the search was not tied to the exigency
claimed to justify it.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Willden testified
that he forced open the door because Mr. Rogers' unwillingness to
let the detectives into his home made Willden nervous, because
Willden perceived a danger because drug dealers are frequently
armed, because he had seen a person wearing "gang" clothing enter
Mr. Rogers' home (R. 130, 134, 136, 161, 163). In contrast to this
testimony reflecting Willden7s supposed fear of Mr. Rogers7
intentions toward the detectives, Willden testified that when he
blocked Mr. Rogers from closing his door, he was acting on the
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belief that Mr. Rogers was simply nervous and upset and had
forgotten to leave the door open (R. 135). The trial court affirmed
both of these justifications, failing to note that the
justifications are contradictory.
While Detective Willden testified that he requested and
forced open Mr. Rogers' door for safety purposes, upon entering the
house containing at least four people, one of whom was wearing
purported gang clothing, neither officer drew his gun, frisked any
of the occupants of Mr. Rogers' home, or conducted a protective
sweep (R. 136-138, 167, 180-181).

Willden simply announced that he

could smell marijuana and again asked Mr. Rogers to consent to the
search of his home (R. 137)• Upon receiving Mr. Rogers' repeated
refusal to consent to the search, Detective Willden conducted no
safety-related measures, but sent Detective Judd to the police car
to call for backup while a warrant was obtained, leaving himself
alone with the four occupants of Mr. Rogers' home, whom he directed
only to move from the dining room to the adjoining front room (R.
137-138, 180-181).
Willden's various explanations as to how his conduct served
a safety interest are also telling.

At the hearing on the motion to

suppress, Willden testified that he felt safer with the door open,
because that enabled him to see into the home to see what was going
on (R. 161). When trial counsel asked Willden if his purpose in
approaching the home was to investigate, Willden retorted, "If I
wanted to look in the house, I could have walked over to the window
that was open." (R. 159). He then admitted that in light of the
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availability of the window, there was no need for the door to remain
open (R. 160)• Willden then turned around on redirect and testified
that he had not testified that the window was open (R. 172). While
Willden testified that open doors improve safety because they allow
an officer to see what is coming (R. 161), he never explained how it
serves a safety interest for an officer to force his way into a home
when the resident is resisting the entry.
Detective Willden7s performance in this case is
particularly troubling because when he approached the magistrate to
get a search warrant, he made no mention of forcing open the door to
Mr. Rogers7 home, or of any exigent circumstances prompting him to
enter Mr. Rogers7 home.

Rather than alleging that he first smelled

the marijuana when he was forcing open the door to Mr. Rogers7 home
in response to exigent circumstances, Willden alleged that he first
smelled the marijuana when Mr. Rogers opened the door to Mr. Rogers7
home.

Affidavit, page 2, in Appendix 4 to this brief.

This

inconsistency, coming from an officer of the law acting under oath,
underscores the need for the Courts to review with great care the
officer7s claim of exigent circumstances.

D. THE SEARCH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF CONSENT OR THE
PLAIN SMELL DOCTRINE.
In the trial court, the State argued that Willden7s opening
the door to Mr. Rogers7 home could be justified on the basis of
consent (R. 67). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
indicated that he recalled the testimony that there was a struggle
between Mr. Rogers and Detective Willden as to whether or not the
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door would remain open or shut, but indicated that the court could
not recall when, in relationship to the struggle, Willden smelled
the unburned marijuana (R. 109-110).

In the prosecutor's findings

and conclusions, which the trial court signed without ever resolving
the evidence for himself, the trial court indicated that Willden's
conduct was "reasonable" in part because Willden believed that Mr.
Rogers had forgotten his agreement to keep open his door.

The

findings and conclusions do not amount to findings and conclusions
of consent.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court's findings and
conclusions can be read as reflective of consent, the findings and
conclusions are clearly erroneous.

The evidence that can be

marshalled to support such findings and conclusions is Detective
Willden's testimony that Mr. Rogers agreed to leave open the door to
his home (R. 11), and Detective Judd's testimony that when Detective
Willden moved to open the door, Willden stated to Rogers, "I asked
you politely to leave the door open — " (R. 179). Willden's claims
of exigent circumstances and his fear of Mr. Rogers contradict the
claim that Willden forced open the door to Mr. Rogers' home because
he believed that Mr. Rogers was closing the door because he had
absentmindedly forgotten his agreement to leave open the door.
Even if Mr. Rogers did agree to leave open the door to his
home, it was only after he revoked that consent by closing his door
and "resisting" or engaging in a "struggle" with Detective Willden
that Willden supposedly smelled the unburned marijuana.

Detective

Willden testified to the following sequence of events: 1) Mr. Rogers
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agreed to leave his door open; 2) Mr. Rogers began closing his door;
3) Detective Willden blocked the door open; 3) Mr. Rogers was trying
to shut the door and resisting Detective Willden's effort to open
the door; 4) Detective Willden smelled the marijuana (R. 135-136).
On cross-examination, Willden testified when he testified that Mr.
Rogers was resisting Willden, he meant that Mr. Rogers was trying to
shut his door, but not while Willden had his hand on it blocking it
open (R. 160-161).

Detective Judd testified that it was during the

struggle with Mr. Rogers that Willden claimed to smell the marijuana
(R. 179, 185-186).
Assuming arguendo that Mr. Rogers' consent to leave open
the door was voluntary, he consented to leave his door open an
unspecified distance, and did not consent to Willden's crossing the
threshold in any manner.

Given the facts that Rogers never opened

his door further than necessary for him to pass through it and kept
the door shut behind him when he went outside to speak with the
detectives, and that the door was between six to eight inches open
when Detective Willden forced the door open (R. 135) , the detective
violated the scope of consent given by Mr. Rogers when he pushed
open the door.

See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App.

1990)(police violate the fourth amendment if their search exceeds
the scope of consent given); Florida v. Jimeno. Ill S.Ct. 1901, 114
L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)(scope of consent is to be determined through the
application of a reasonable person standard).
The search of Mr. Rogers' home cannot be justified under
the plain smell doctrine, because Detective Willden supposedly
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smelled the unburned marijuana only upon his pushing open the door
to Mr. Rogers' home, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Cf. e.g.

Horton v. California. 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990)("It is, of course, an
essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of
incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth
Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be
plainly viewed.11).

II.
ABSENT THE ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO
THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE,
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT
DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE WARRANT.
A copy of the search warrant and affidavit obtained by
Detective Willden is in Appendix 4 to this brief.

As is established

in point I of this brief, at the time that Detective Willden entered
Mr. Rogers' home without a warrant, he had no reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or exigent circumstances justifying his action.

In

obtaining the search warrant subsequent to entering Mr. Rogers'
home, Willden relied heavily on his detection of the smell of
marijuana, which was illegal.
In assessing the validity of the search warrant, this Court
"should excise the tainted evidence and determine whether the
remaining, untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate
with probable cause to issue a warrant."
834 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1987).

United States v. Vasey.

Accord, United States v. Karo,

468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).
The facts alleged by Detective Willden in the affidavit
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state, in relevant part,
On December 2nd, 1991, Detective Kevin Judd
was contacted by an anonymous male who stated
that at 1935 South 900 East, a gray house, there
was an individual named Steve, who was involved
in the sale of large quantities of marijuana.
Detective Judd asked this anonymous individual
how much was a large quantity. This individual
stated that Steve was holding one hundred pounds
of marijuana at this time. This individual would
not identify himself, and hung up at this time.
On December 2nd, 1991, Detective Kevin Judd
and your affiant went to 1935 South 900 Esat, the
address sought to be searched. Contact was made
at the residence with an individual who
identified himself as Steve Rogers. Rogers was
very nervous. Rogers denied your affiants
request to come into the residence and speak to
him. Rogers did agree to obtain identification
from within the residence. As Rogers opened the
door, an odor of marijuana could be smelled
coming from the residence. Entry was then made
into the residence, and Rogers was advised that
we could smell the marijuana, and was again asked
for consent.2 Rogers requested a search
warrant. At which time, he was detained and your
affiant left the residence, which was secured by
other members of the Metro-Narcotics Task Force.
Affidavit, page 2.

2. As trial counsel noted, Detective Willden did not inform
the magistrate as to the true circumstances surrounding Willden7s
warrantless entry into Mr. Rogers' home, which led to the detection
of the smell of marijuana. Defendant's Reply Memorandum, Motion to
Suppress, at page 10. It is particularly troubling that in
discussing the smell of marijuana, Detective Willden alleged in the
affidavit that he detected the smell when Mr. Rogers opened the door
to his home, rather than alleging as he testified under oath that
Willden detected the smell when Willden forced open Mr. Rogers'
door. Also notably missing from the affidavit are any indications
that Detective Willden saw any people enter Mr. Rogers' home, that
Detective Willden saw any person wearing a Raiders hat and a black
tee shirt and jacket enter Mr. Rogers' home, or that Detective
(footnote omitted)

-29-

After redacting the references to the smell of marijuana,
this Court can see that the remainder of the affidavit, relying on
Mr. Rogers7 nervousness and assertion of his rights, and on the bare
allegation of the anonymous informant, is inadequate to establish
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.

See discussion of

probable cause, supra point IB, and the search warrant affidavit, in
appendix 4 to this brief.

CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the trial court sanctioned the
warrantless entry of a home in the absence of reasonable suspicion,
probable cause or exigent circumstances.

In so doing, the trial

court never resolved the facts of the case for himself and
erroneously adopted the State's argument that the entry of Mr.
Rogers' home could be justified if it satisfied the same standard
governing a level two Terry stop.

In so doing, the trial court

overlooked the facts of the case demonstrating the falsity of the
claim of exigent circumstances, and the failure of the detective to
honestly state the facts in the search warrant affidavit.

The trial

court's gentle approach was apparently based on the State's

(footnote 2 continued)
Willden entered Mr. Rogers' home because he perceived a danger to
himself and Detective Judd. The Detective's falsehoods, which were
uttered with nothing less than reckless disregard for the truth,
demonstrate further reason for redacting from the affidavit the
references to Willden's supposed detection of the smell of unburned
marijuana. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-156, 172
(1978) .
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argument that the detective's forcing open the door to Mr. Rogers'
home was a only "minimal intrusion."
The trial court's ruling goes against years of state and
federal constitutional law recognizing the sanctity of the home, and
if sanctioned by this Court, would give the police unprecedented
discretion to violate the sanctity of the home.
What the Court said long ago bears repeating now:
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its
mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconsitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure."
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)(citation
omitted).
This Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court and
order all evidence seized in violation of Mr. Rogers' constitutional
y

rights suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/y^ day of January,

1993.

~~1
ELIZAB:
Attorney for

T
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APPENDIX 1
Constitutional Provisions

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

APPENDIX 2
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RUTH J. MCCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

)

Case No. 921900105FS

STEVEN ASHBY ROGERS,

)

Plaintiff,

Honorable Frank G. Noel
Defendant.

)

Based upon the Defendants Motion to Suppress and the
testimony of witnesses, arguments, and memoranda of counsel, the
Court now makes the followings:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On December 2, 1991, Metro Narcotics Officers Steve

Willden and Kevin Judd went to Defendants home to investigate an
anonymous

"tip" in which the caller indicated that a man named

"Steve11, residing at 1935 South 900 East, was dealing in large
quantities

of

marijuana

and

there

were

large

amounts

in

the

residence at the time.
2.

As they were searching for a place to park their

vehicle, the police officers saw two males and one female, one of
them wearing clothing consistent with gafl^ membership, enter the
residence.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 921900105FS
Page two

3.

Upon

arriving

at

Defendant's

residence,

the

officers, Willden and Judd, identified themselves and asked to come
inside and speak with Defendant who identified himself as "Steve."
4.

The Defendant told the officers that they could not

enter the home and the Defendant stepped outside onto the porch to
speak with them.
5.

When

the

officers

asked

the

Defendant

for

identification so they could write their report, Defendant said it
was inside the residence and he would have to go inside to get it.
6.

The officers asked Defendant to leave the door open

for their safety while he went inside and Defendant agreed to leave
the door open.
7.

Based on their training and experience in narcotics

enforcement, the officers were concerned about weapons in the house
because people who deal in narcotics are often armed.
8.

During

the

conversation

on

the

porch,

Defendant

appeared nervous and upset and each time that he went through the
door, he opened it only enough to slip in or out.

While on the

porch, Defendant kept the door closed.
9.

After

Defendant

slipped

inside the residence, he

began closing the door.
10.

At that time, Detective Willden put his hand on the

door to keep it from closing and reminded Defendant that he had
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agreed

to keep the door open, thinking that the Defendant had

forgotten.
11.

At the point in time at which Willden used his hand

to keep the door from closing, he smelled the odor of marijuana
coming from within the residence.
12.

After Detective Willden smelled what he suspected

from his training and experience to be marijuana coming from within
the residence, he pushed the door open and stepped inside to secure
the individuals who might be there and to prevent the destruction
of evidence.
13.

When

the

officers

entered

the

residence,

they

explained to Defendant that they could smell marijuana and they
again asked for permission to search the residence.

The Defendant

denied the request.
14.

Detective Judd called for backup help from other

officers and when they arrived, Judd and Willden went to obtain a
search

warrant

anonymous

phone

based

upon

the

information

call, the verification

obtained

of the

from

individual

the
named

Steve at the described location, and the odor of marijuana.
15.

Upon returning with a Search Warrant, the officers

found

approximately

items

connected

Defendant.

to

four pounds of marijuana, as well as other
the

sale

of

marijuana,

and

arrested

the
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The initial entry occurred when Detective Willden

placed his hand on the door to prevent it's closing and this entry
was a reasonable entry.
2.

The intrusion into the privacy of Defendant's home

was minimal and was justified by the officers' concern for their
safety

based

on

their

observations

of

the

individual

who

had

previously entered the home, their experience with individuals who
deal in narcotics being armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into
the home

thereby

possibly

alerting

other

individuals

to police

presence and possibly gaining access to weapons.
3.

In addition, it was reasonable that the officers

believed the Defendant had agreed to leave the door open and had
forgotten to do so in his nervousness.
4.

The odor of marijuana

was detected

by

Detective

Willden while he was in a location where he had a right to be, i.e.
the

front

porch

with

one hand

preventing

the

full

closing

of

Defendant's door.
5.

The

second

entry

into

the

home

occurred

when

Detectives Judd and Willden went inside to secure the premises.
There was no information obtained as a result of that entry that
was used to provide probable cause for the Search Warrant.
6.

The Search Warrant was valid, being supported by
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legally obtained evidence which provided probable cause to search
the residence.
7.
legally

All of the evidence being offered by the State was

obtained,

without violation

of Defendant's rights under

either Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, nor
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
8.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied and all of

the State's evidence is admissible.
DATED this

/£) day of July, 1992.

Approved as to Form:

JOHN D. O'CONNELL
Attorney for the Defendant
RJM/sc/0606
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sequently there are no specific, articulable, Fourth Amendment purposes; and (3)
objective facts which woufd justify the im- search woufd not be reviewed for constituposition of warrantless, mandatory urinaly- tional propriety through judgment of reasis of the policemen m this case.
sonableness of intrusion by balancing competing interests at stake, but rather,
bright-line rule that Fourth Amendment
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
prohibited searches of dwellings without
dissenting.
probable
cause would be adhered to.
For the reasons set forth in Loworn v.
City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1359 (6th
District Court order reversed; prior
Cir.1988), I must respectfully dissent.
opinion and judgment of conviction vacated; and case remanded.
Farris and Alarcon, Circuit Judges,
filed dissenting opinions.

lfrUTED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
y.

Steven Dale WINSOR,
Defendant-Appellant
No. 86-5179.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit
Argued En Banc and Submitted
Nov. 9, 1987.
Decided May 24, 1988.
Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, Richard »£. Gadbois, Jr.,
J., of possessing proceeds taken in bank
robbery, and he appealed, challenging denial of motion to suppress certain evidence.
The Court of Appeals, 816 F.2d 1394, affirmed. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals,
822 F.2d 1466, voted that the case should
be reheard en banc. On rehearing, the
Court of Appeals, Norris, Circuit Judge,
held that (1) hot pursuit of bank robber
into iiotel did not provide sufficient cause
to Search each room in the hotel, for
Fourth Amendment purposes; (2) police did
conduct "search" of hotel room when they
gained visual entry into room through door
that was 'opened at their command and
while they stood in hotel corridor, for

1. Searches and Seizures <£=*43, 44
Hot pursuit of bank robber into hotel
did not provide sufficient cause to search
• each room in hotel, so as to excuse police
from Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in searching hotel rooms; hot pursuit
may excuse police from Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but never excuses absence of requisite degree of suspicion before effecting of search. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
2. Searches and Seizures e»176
Police conduct in searching hotel
rooms after they pursued bank robber into
hotel was not immune from constitutional
attack on Fourth Amendment grounds
based on fact police operated with consent
of hotel manager; hotel proprietor could
not waive his guests' Fourth Amendment
rights. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
3. Searches and Seizures G»26
Each hotel room enjoyed its own zone
of Fourth Amendment protection, and hotel
resident's expectation of privacy was not
reduced simply because he lived in single
room in low rent hotel rather than in single-family house or apartment. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures e»17
Police conducted "search" within purview of Fourth Amendment when they
looked into hotel room through door that
was opened at their command while they
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stood in hotel corridor. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

5. Searches and Seizures <s=>181
Search of hotel room conducted by police gaining visual entry into hotel room
through door that was opened at their command while they stood in hotel corridor
could not be sustained on basis of consent
on theory hotel room door was voluntarily
opened; police knocked on the door, identified themselves as police, demanded that
occupants open door, and occupant opened
door on command. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
4.
6. Searches and Seizures <s==l7, 25
Intrusivaness of search was measured
not by its,^scope, but by expectation of
privacy upon which search intruded, and
accordingly, police search of hotel room by
gaining visual entry into room through
door that was opened at their command
while they stood in hotel corridor could not
be found constitutionally permissible on
theory that search was not full-blown
search for evidence requiring probable
cause, but was at most a limited intrusion
requiring only reasonable suspicion; no
search of dwelling could be deemed minor
intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights.
U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4.

ings without probable cause would be adhered to. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
9. Criminal Law ^394.4(11)
Fruits of warrantless search of hotel
room conducted after bank robber was pursued into hotel would not be found admissible on ground police conducted the search
in good faith; good-faith exception to exclusionary rule had been applied only to
searches conducted in good-faith reliance
on warrant or statute later declared to be
unconstitutional, and good-faith exception
would not be extended to search not conducted in reliance on warrant or statute.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
Carlton F. Gunn, Deputy Federal Public
Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendantappellant
George B. Newhouse, Asst U.S. Atty.,
San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of California.
Before BROWNING, ANDERSON*,
TANG, FLETCHER, FARRIS,
PREGERSON, ALARCON, CANBY,
NORRIS, BEEZER, and WIGGINS,
Circuit Judges.

7. Searches and Seizures <£»40
United States Supreme Court had apparently judicially adopted bright-line rule
requiring probable cause to support search
of dwelling. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
8. Searches and Seizures <£=>40
Police search of hotel room when they
gained visual entry into room through door
that was opened at their command while
they stood in hotel corridor would not be
reviewed for Constitutional propriety
through judgment of reasonableness of intrusion by balancing competing interests at
stake; lather, bright-line rule that Fourth
Amendment prohibited searches of dwell-

NORRIS, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Steven Winsor was found
guilty by a jury of possessing forty dollars
taken in a bank robbery.1 See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(c). On appeal he argues that his
conviction rests on evidence obtained as a
result of an unconstitutional search of the
hotel room where he lived. A panel of this
court affirmed the conviction, holding that
although the police searched the room with
only reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because it was a minimal intrusion justified by important law
enforcement interests. United States v.
Winsor, 816 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.1987). A

* Judge Anderson participated in oral argument
but died prior <p the issuance of this opinion.

1. He was acquitted on a charge of aiding and
abetting an unarmed bank robbery. See 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a).
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limited en banc panel was convened to review the case following a vote of the majority of our active judges. See United
States v. Winsor, 822 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.
1987).
We now hold that Winsor's motion to
suppress must be granted because the
search of Winsor's room without probable
cause violated the Fourth Amendment.
The panel opinion and the judgment of
conviction are, accordingly, vacated and the
case is remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.

Probable cause to enter and to search the
room, which they did. Inside, they found
appellant Steven Winsor and evidence of
the bank robbery. Both Winsors were arrested. While in custody, Steven made incriminating statements which he later
moved to suppress along with the evidence
found during the search of the room.
II

[1] The district court denied Winsor's
motion to suppress on the basis of the
government's argument that "hot pursuit"
I
of the bank robber into the hotel provided
In January 1986, Dennis Winsor (appel- sufficient cause to search each room in the
lant's brother, who is not a party to this hotel, including Winsor's. We agree with
appeal) robbed a bank in Hollywood and the original panel that this was error. As
fled on foot. Los Angeles Police Depart- the panel stated, "[h]ot pursuit may excuse
ment* (LAPD) Officer Bowser saw him run police from the Fourth Amendment's warout* of the bank and pursued him to the • rant requirement, but never does it excuse
nearby Chesterfield Hotel, a two-story low* the absence of the requisite degree of susrent residential hotel. In response to Bowpicion before effecting a search." 816 F.2d
ser's call for assistance, LAPD and FBI
at 1396; see United States v. Scott, 520
officers surrounded the hotel and a police
F,2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.1975), cert denied,
helicopter circled above. Before entering
423 U.S. 1056, 96 S.Ct 788, 46 L.Ed.2d 645
the hotel, the officers were informed that
(1976).
no weapon had been seen during the robbery, although the robber had suggested
[2] The district court also ruled that the
he had a gun by holding his hand in his
police conduct was immune from constitupocket.
tional attack because the police operated
The police decided to enter the hotel and with the consent of the hotel manager.
to go from room to room looking for the Again, we agree with the original panel
suspect At each room, two LAPD officers that this was error because a "hotel propriand an FBI agent, with their guns drawn, etor cannot waive his guests' Fourth
knocked on the door and announced: "Po- Amendment rights." 816 F.2d at 1397 n. 3;
lice. Open the door." Tliree residents of see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
the Chesterfield who somewhat fit the de- 489-90, 84 S.Ct 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856
scription of the bank robber were ordered
(1964).
to leave their rooms'to go to the hotel
The original panel nonetheless affirmed
manager's office for identification. After
the
district court's denial of Winsor's supchecking all the rooms on the first floor
and some of the rooms on the second floor pression motion. The panel decided that
(approximately fifteen to twenty-five the search passed constitutional muster
rooms) the officers arrived at the room even though the police had only reasonable
where Steven and Dennis Winsor were liv- suspicion rather than probable cause to being When the police knocked on the door lieve that the suspect would be in any one
,a&l demanded that it be opened, Dennis of the rooms that had not yet been
Winsor obeyed. The police recognized him searched, because the minimal intrusion on
as the robber, pointed their guns at him, Winsor's privacy rights was outweighed by
and told yim to put his hands up, which he important law enforcement interests. 816
did. At this point, the police of course had F.2d at 1398-99.
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III
[3] We now turn to the issues as defined by the parties during en banc briefing
and argument. Before doing so, however,
we find it helpful to clarify two points that
are not in dispute. First, at the time the
police knocked on Winsor's door, they had
reasonable suspicion to believe that the
suspected bank robber was inside, but did
not have probable cause to believe so. Second, each room of the hotel, including Winsor's, enjoyed its own zone of Fourth
Amendment protection, and Winsor's expectation of privacy was not reduced simply because he lived in a single room in a
low-rent hotel rather than in a single-family
house or apartment2
Winsor argues that the police effected a
nonconsensual search of the room .when
they Imocked on the door and commanded
that' it be opened under claim of lawful
authority. He argues further that under
Arizona v. Hicks, — U.S.
, 107 S.Ct.
1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), the search of
his one-room residence could not be based
on a level of suspicion less than probable
cause.
The government argues that the police
did not effect a search when they first
viewed the interior of the room because
they had not yet physically entered it. The
government further argues that even if a
search without probable cause was effected
when the police looked through the open
door into the interior of the room, that
search was not unconstitutional because it
"was not a full blown search for evidence"
requiring probable cause, But was at most
a "limited intrusion" requiring only reasonable suspicion. Appellee's Supplemental
Brief at 5. Such limited intrusions, the
government contends, may be conducted on
less than probable cause if the governmental interest in conducting the search outweighs the jntrusion on the privacy interests of the subject of the search. Finally,
the government appears to argue that even
iffjfce search of Winsor's room constituted
hiore than a limited intrusion, the overriding governmental interest in apprehendis clear that Winsor's Fourth Amendment rights would have been no less protected

ing a suspected bank robber outweighed
the intrusion on Winsor's privacy interests
and thus, under the circumstances, the
search was constitutional.
IV
[4] The threshold question we must decide is whether the police conducted a
search within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment when they looked into Winsor's room through the open door while
standing in the hotel corridor.
In essence, the government maintains
that police do not effect a search of a home
when they force open the front door and
look inside without crossing the threshold.
According to the government, "the cases
are clear that without some form of 'entry*
into the room, either physical or with the
aid of electronic or sophisticated visual en' hancement, a mere command to open the
door does not transform a legitimate police
procedure into a search." Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 2.
We agree with Winsor that this assertion
"flies in the face of both precedent and
common sense." Appellant's Supplemental
Brief at 1. As the Supreme Court made
clear in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967), "the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure." To draw a distinction
based upon whether there had been a physical entry into the premises would enable
police officers to evade the reach of the
Fourth Amendment simply by forcing a
door open and visually examining the interior without crossing the threshold. That
the officers gained visual access to the
interior of a dwelling without physically
entering it is irrelevant to the question
whether a search was effected. We find
support for our position not only in Katz
but also in United States v. Johnson, 626
F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1980), ajfd on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct 2579, 73
L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). In Johnson, police
had he been an overnight guest of the hotel
Stoner, 376 VS. at 490, 84 S.Ct at 893.
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standing outside the front door of a home
arrested a person standing inside the door.
We rejected the government's argument
that the arrest was not inside the home
because the police had not crossed the
threshold, reasoning that "it is the location
of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an
arrest occurs within a home. Otherwise,
arresting officers could avoid illegal 'entry'
into a home simply by remaining outside
the doorway and controlling the movements of suspects within...." 626 F.2d at
757. See also United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3303, 82
L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) (holding that a warrantless "search" of a home conducted by monitoring a radio transmitter violated the
Fourth Amendment, noting, "[a]t <the risk
of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one
that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable").
[5] Neither of the cases relied upon by
the government undermines our position.
In United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228,
229-30 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S.
1008, 93 S.Ct. 442, 34 L.Ed.2d 301 (1972),
the police, while standing on the front
porch, looked through a window and saw
incriminating evidence inside the residence.
We held no search was effected because
police merely did what any member of the
3. We reject the government's further argument
that any search that may have occurred can be
sustained on the basis of consent because Dennis Winsor "voluntarily" opened the door. Appellee's Brief at 23. We agree with the original
panel that "[cjompliance with a police 'demand'
is not consent." 816 F.2d at 1397. Accord
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49,
88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).
Contrary to the suggestion of Judge Farns's
dissent, this conclusion does not rest on appellate fact-finding. The essential facts are not in
dispute; the district court found that the police
knocked on the door, identified themselves as
^police, and "demand[ed] that the occupants
open the door," and that "Dennis Winsor
opened the door on command." Excerpt of
Record at 84-85. On these facts, there can be
no consent as a matter of law. See, e.g., Bumper, 39IOJ.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. at 1791-92 (hold-

public was free to do—walk onto the front
Porch and observe whatever was in plain
view through an unobstructed window.
Similarly, in Davis v. United States, 327
F,2d 301, 303 (9th Cir.1964), the police did
what any person could do—they knocked
oti the front door of a residence, but did not
use their authority as police officers to
command the occupants to open the door.
When the occupant opened the door, he did
so voluntarily, not, as Dennis Winsor did, in
response to a claim of lawful authority.1
In sum, we hold that the police did effect
a "search" when they gained visual entry
into the room through the door that was
opened at their command.
Having decided that the police searched
Winsor's room, we now consider the appropriate level of suspicion constitutionally required to justify the search. Winsor argues that Arizona v. Hicks, — U.S. ,
107 S.Ct 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), controls this case. In Hicks, the police were
lawfully inside an apartment to investigate
the source of gunfire reported by neighbors. While inside, one officer noticed an
expensive stereo that seemed out of place
in the poorly furnished apartment Suspecting that the stereo was stolen, the officer moved the turntable slightly to note its
serial number. The Supreme Court held
that in moving the turntable, the officer
effected a search of the apartment which
w&s unrelated to the lawful objective of the
Ing as a matter of law that consent to search
given after police officer asserted he had a
Search warrant was not freely given); Johnson
v. United States, 333 VS. 10, 12-13, 68 S.Ct. 367,
568-69, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) (search not voluntary where police officer knocked on door, identified himself, and said "I want to talk to you a
httle bit"); Ames v. United States, 255 U.S. 323,
$15-17, 41 S.Ct. 266. 267-68, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921)
(search not voluntary where law enforcement
officers identified themselves and told occupant
that they "had come to search the premises");
United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893
(9th Cir. 1985) (defendant did not voluntarily
bpen door of his residence after police, with
weapons drawn, surrounded the residence and
Ordered him through a bullhorn to come outside), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S.Ct. 2255,
% L.Ed.2d 700 (1986).
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police entry, id. 107 S.Ct at 1152, and that
"[a] dwelling-place search, no less than a
dwelling-place seizure, requires probable
cause." Id. at 1154. Winsor reads Hicks
as establishing a rule that the police violate
the Fourth Amendment whenever they effect a search of a dwelling without probable cause.
[6] The government, in arguing that
Hicks does not control this case, again relies on the fact that the police viewed the
interior of the room without physically entering it.? Although conceding that "[a]ctuaft physical entry by the police into a home
to conduct a search would be so intrusive
that probable cause might be required,"
the government contends that "where ...
physical entry is lacking, the nature of the
intrusion changes as a matter of kind, not
degree, and the 'dwelling place' bright line
test articulated^oy Hicks is inapplicable."
Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 9 n. 4. In
other words, the government argues that
although Hicks established a bright-line
rule requiring probable cause for dwellingplace searches, it is not controlling authority here because this search "was not a full
blown search for evidence" requiring probable cause, but at most was "a limited
intrusion" requiring only reasonable suspicion. Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 5.

number—we cannot read it as suggesting
that the bright-line rule applies only to
dwelling-place searches that are broad in
scope. Indeed, Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, expressly refused to make any
such distinction between limited and full
searches:
Justice O'Connor's dissent suggests that
we uphold the action here on the ground
that it was a 'cursory inspection' rather
than a 'full-blown search/ and could
therefore be justified by reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause. [...]
We are unwilling to send police and
judges into a new thicket of Fourth
Amendment law, to seek a creature of
uncertain description that is neither a
plain-view inspection nor yet a 'full-blown
.search.' Nothing in the prior opinions of
/this Court supports such a distinction
107 S.Cb at 1154.
The government cites no authority, and
we know of none, that a search of a residence may constitute such a limited intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests that it
may be justified by a degree of suspicion
less than probable cause. The intrusiveness of a search is measured not by its
scope, but by the expectation of privacy
upon which the search intrudes. See infra
[7] We agree with the government that Part VI. Because the expectation of privaHicks apparently adopted a bright-line rule cy in one's home is that most jealously
requiring probable cause to support a guarded by the Fourth Amendment,* the
search of a dwelling.4 Unlike the govern- Supreme Court has never suggested that a
ment, however, we find nothing in Hicks to search of a home, however limited in scope,
suggest that the Court, in establishing this could ever be considered less than a major
bright-line rule, intended to apply it duly to intrusion. In the absence of such authoriwhat the government labels "full-blown ty, we follow Hicks in holding that no
searches for evidence." Since Hicks in- search of a dwelling may be deemed a
volved the least full-blown search imagin- minor 6 intrusion on Fourth Amendment
able—moving a phonograph to see its serial rights.
Amendment] stands the right of a man to re4. The original panel also read Hicks as apparently announcing a bright line rule for dwellingtreat into his own home and there be free from
place searches. 816 F.2d at 1399 n. 5.
unreasonable governmental intrusion.")
\
5. The sanctity of the home enjoys special solici- 6. There is no merit in the government's additude in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
tional argument that the bright-line rule of
That solicitude springs from the language of the
Hicks should not apply because this was a
Amendment^Jself, which specifically guards the
search of Dennis Winsor, not of the room. Ap"right of the people to be secure in their ...
pellee's Supplemental Brief at 4-5. The police
houses." See, e.g.t Silverman v. United States,
were looking for Dennis, but they searched the
365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 LEd.2d
room.
734 (1961) ("At the tery core [of the Fourth
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In urging us to apply such a balancing
analysis in this case, the government relies
on the following passage from Justice
White's opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,

469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct 733, 740, 83
L.Ed.2d 720 (1985):
To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into
the standards governing such searches.
Although the underlying command of the
Fourth Amendment is always that
searches and seizures be reasonable,
what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.
The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class
of searches requires "balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the
search entails."
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 537, 87 S.Ct 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.
2d 930 (1967)). The government further
contends that Hicks implicitly contemplates
ithe general application of such a balancing
analysis, citing the following dicta:
We do not say, of course, that a seizure
can never be justified on less than probably cause. We have held that it can—
where, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only practicable means
of detecting certain types of crime.
Hicks, 107 S.Ct at 1154. The government's reading of T.LO. and Hicks would
expand the role of the balancing test in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence well beyond the limited place the Supreme Court
has given it to date.
As we read T.L.O., Hicksf and other Supreme Court cases, the Court has developed a two-tier approach to the Fourth
Amendment The general rule is that seizures and searches must be supported by
probable cause. At the same time, the
Court has recognized a narrowly defined
exception to this general rule. A level of
suspicion less than probable cause may justify h search or seizure if the intrusion on
Fourth Amendment interests is minimal,
and Jf the minimal intrusion is outweighed

7. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,.houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violafed, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
Place to be searched, and the persons or
tilings to be seized.
US. Const, amend. IV.

I8J In the last analysis, the government's position is that the search, however
intrusive, passes constitutional muster because Winsor's privacy interests were outweighed by the law enforcement interests
at stake. This argument, premised on the
bold assertion that "[n]o court has ever
held that probable cause is a necessary
requirement of a valid search in any given
context," Appellee's Supplemental Brief at
#7, is a radical one. Construing the two
clauses of the Fourth Amendment—the
proscription of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and the probable cause requirement—the government would apparently
have us dispense with the probable cause
requirement and judge every search by its
reasonableness.7 The reasonableness of
each search would' be assessed by balancing the competing interests at stake.
Thus* the government argues that "the appropriate constitutional* test by which to
assess [the] reasonableness [of the search
of Winsor's room] involves a 'careful balancing of governmental and private interests.' " Appellee's Supplemental Brief at
10 (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S.
325, 341, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 LEd.2d 720
(1985)). The government argues that the
Fourth Amendment interests sacrificed in
the search were outweighed by the law
enforcement interests in apprehending the
fleeing bank robber. Specifically, the
government argues that "it is clear both
from the circumstances requiring this exigent procedure and from the manner in
which the search was actually conducted,
that the search was a carefully limited one,
and that it was the least intrusive means
possible to accomplish the essential state
interest of protecting the public from a
potentially dangerous felon." Appellee's
Supplemental Brief at 5-6.
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by the governmental interests served by
port a seizure based on less than probathe police action. Generally speaking, the
ble cause.
Supreme Court has defined a minimally Id. at 703,103 S.Ct at 2642 (quoting Terry,
intrusive seizure as one that occurs in pub- 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). In Place,
lic and is brief. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, the Court refused to apply the Terry rea392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 sonable suspicion standard because the 90(1968); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. minute seizure of luggage in an airport
221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 was too lengthy to qualify as the sort of
(1985). The Supreme Court has assessed minimal intrusion contemplated by Terry.
the intrusiveness of a search, on the other Id. at 709-10, 103 S.Ct at 2645-46.
hand, by considering whether it invades an
Similarly, in Dunaway v. New York, 442
"expectation of privacy . . . that society is U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable/" (1979), the Court rejected the state's arguKatz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct at 516 ment that police may take a suspect to the
(Harlan, J., concurring). Specifically, the police station without probable cause beCourt has upheld searches conducted on cause the government's interests in crime
less than probable cause when they occur prevention and detection outweigh the inin certain clearly defined places which by trusion on the suspect's Fourth Amendtheir public nature give rise to reduced ment interests. Writing for the Court, Jusexpectations of privacy. See infra pages tice Brennan observed:
1577.
The narrow intrusions involved in [Terry
and its progeny] were judged by a balThe genesis of the Court's two-tier apancing test rather than by the general
proach is, of course, Terry v. Ohio, 392
principle that Fourth Amendment seiU.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
zures must be supported by the "longIn Terry, a seizure case, the Court upheld
prevailing standards" of probable cause
the brief detention of a person in a public
. . . only because these intrusions fell far
place and a "frisk" for weapons based on
short of the kind of intrusion associated
reasonable suspicion rather than probable
with an arrest
cause. Since Terry, the Court has continued to refine its two-tier approach. For Id. at 212, 99 S.Ct at 2256 (quoting Brineinstance, writing for the Court in United gar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).
2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), Justice O'Con- The Court expressed grave concern about
the prospect of extending the balancing
nor explained:
The exception to the probable-cause re- test to more intrusive police conduct
[T]he protections intended by the Framquirement for limited seizures of the perers
could all too easily disappear in the
son recognized in Terry and its progeny
consideration
and balancing of multifarrests on a balancing of the competing
ious
circumstances
presented by differinterests to determine the reasonableent
cases,
especially
when that balancing
ness of the type of seizure involved withmay
be
done
in
the
first instance by
in the meaning of "the Fourth Amendpolice officers engaged in the "often
ment's general proscription against uncompetitive enterprise of ferreting out
reasonable searches and seizures." We
crime." . . . Indeed, our recognition of
must balance the nature and quality of
these dangers, and our consequent relucthe intrusion on the individual's Fourth
tance to depart from the proved protecAmendment interests against the importions afforded by the general rule, are
tance of the governmental interests alreflected in the narrow limitations emleged to justify the intrusion. When the
phasized in the cases employing the balnature t^nd extent of the detention are
ancing test. For all but those narrowly
minimdfay intrusive of the individual's
defined intrusions, the requisite 'balFourth Amendment interests, the opposancing' has been performed in centuries
ing law enforcement interests can sup-
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The cases in which the Court has applied
of precedent and embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if a balancing test to determine whether a
search could be sustained on less than
supported by probable cause.
probable
cause have involved, without exId at 213-14, 99 S.Ct. at 2257 (quoting
ception,
searches
that occurred in places
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14,
where
expectations
of privacy are necessar68 S.Ct 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)). See
ily
reduced.
Thus,
the Court authorized a
also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
governmental
employer
to search, for
697-98, 101 S.Ct 2587, 2591, 69 L.Ed.2d
work-related
reasons
and
upon
reasonable
340 (1981) ("[S]ome seizures significantly
suspicion,
an
employee's
office,
noting
that
less intrusive than an arrest have with"the
privacy
interests
of
government
emstood scrutiny under the reasonableness
ployees in their places of work ..., while
standard embodied in the Fourth Amendnot insubstantial, are far less than those
ment In these cases the intrusion on the
found at home or in some other contexts."
citizen's privacy 'was so much less severe'
O'Connor v. Ortega, — U.S.
, 107
than that involved in a traditional arrest
S.Ct 1492,1502, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (pluthat 'the opposing interests in crime prerality opinion). Similarly, the Court has
vention and detection and in the pojice offi- held that authorities may search, on less
cer's safety' coujd support the seizure as than probable cause, the place of business
reasonable.") (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. of an organization in a pervasively regulatat 209, 99 S.Ct at 2254).8
ed industry because the regulation reduces
The Court's two-tier approach also be- the expectation of privacy. See New York
comes apparent from a comparison of cases v. Burger, — U.S.
, 107 S.Ct 2636,
in which the Supreme Court has and has 2644, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987); United States
not upheld a search on less than probable v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316, 92 S.Ct 1593,
cause. As Hicks and T.L.O. nicely illus- 1596, 32 LEd.2d 87 (1972). See also Cody
trate, in the search context, the level of v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448, 93 S.Ct
suspicion required to justify police action 2523, 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) (upholdturns on the expectation of privacy that ing search of a car trunk upon reasonable
society will recognize in the place in which suspicion after owner no longer had possesthe search occurred. In Hicks, the Court sion of car); South Dakota v. Opperman,
applied the general rule requiring probable 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct 3092, 3096, 49
cause because the place searched—a resi- L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (upholding an inventodence—is a place where societally sanc- ry search of an impounded automobile on
tioned expectations of privacy are at their less than probable cause); United States v.
strongest 107 S.Ct at 1154. In T.LO., by Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593,
contrast, the balancing test was applied 103 S.Ct 2573, 2582, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983)
and the search was sustained on the basis (customs officials may, on less than probaof reasonable suspicion because the search ble cause, stop and board vessels on inland
took place in a public school, where privacy waterways with access to the open seas to
interests are necessarily reduced. 469 U.S. examine documentation because the brief
detention of the vessel and inspection of
at 338, 105 S.Ct. at 741.
8. The Court employed a similar analysis in several cases involving stops and brief inspections
of cars analogous to Terry stops. To illustrate,
in United States v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 VS. 873,
884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975),
*'i ^ the Court said that the border patrol could employ roving patrols to question occupants of an
automobile about their citizenship upon reasonable suspicion that the occupants were aliens
illegally in the country. The Court noted that
the intrusion was "modest," involving a stop
that "usually consumes no more than a minute."
Aifet 880, 95 S.Ct. at 2579. And, in United

States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543t 557-58,
96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082-83, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976),
the Court employed a balancing analysis to determine that the border patrol could detain cars
briefly at fixed checkpoints away from the border without reasonable suspicion that the motorists might be aliens because the intrusiveness
of the stop and investigation was minor. See
abo Delaware v. Prouse, 440 VS. 648, 663, 99
S.CL 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (police
can stop vehicles to inspect license and registration upon reasonable suspicion that the driver is
unlicensed or the vehicle is unregistered).
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the public deck area are minimally intru- et in search of evidence rather than a weapsive); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60, on is more intrusive than a Terry "frisk"
99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884-85, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 for weapons and cannot be sustained on
(1979) (upholding routine visual inspections less than probable cause); Berger v. New
of body cavities of pretrial detainees be- York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59, 87 S.Ct. 1873,
cause incarcerated persons of necessity re- 1883-84, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (statute
linquish expectations of privacy that others authorizing electronic eavesdropping on
enjoy); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. less than probable cause violates the
606, 619, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1980, 52 L.Ed.2d Fourth Amendment).
617 (1977) (upholding routine searches of
That the Supreme Court has limited the
people ajid things crossing the border,
balancing
approach to discrete places
b&sed on Congress's plenary power to conwhere
expectations
of privacy are necessartrol the borders); Balelo v. Baldridge, 724
F.2d 753, 764-66 (9th Cir.) (en banc) ily reduced is not surprising. As Justice
(government observers may board regulat- Scalia, the crucial fifth vote in O'Connor v.
, 107 S.Ct 1492, 94
ed fishing boats on a scheduled basis with- Ortega, — U.S.
out probable cause, but may not search L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), admonished the fourpersons, personal effects, or living quar- Justice plurality, a fact-specific case-byters of the cre#), cert denied, 467 U.S. c&se approach would plunge courts into a
1252, 104 S.Ct.^536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984). neverending and essentially standardless
The Supreme Court has consistently re- assessment of every search:
The plurality opinion instructs the lower
fused, however, to engage in a balancing of
courts
that existence of Fourth Amendcompeting interests or to sustain a search
ment
protection
for a public employee's
on less than probable cause when the
business
office
is
to be assessed "on a
search occurred in a place where society
case-by-case
basis,"
in light of whether
recognizes a strong interest in privacy. As
the
office
is
"so
open
to fellow employees
noted above, the Court in Hicks required
or the public that no expectation of privaprobable cause to move a phonograph becy is reasonable." No clue is provided as
cause the search occurred in an apartment
to how open "so open" must be; much
Similarly, in United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891, 896, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2588, 45
less is it suggested how police officers
L.Ed.2d 623 (1975), the Court, noting that a
are to gather the facts necessary for this
full search of a car "is a substantial invarefined inquiry. As we observed in Olision of privacy," held that probable cause
ver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181
is required to search an automobile at a
[104 S.Ct. 1735, 1743, 80 L.Ed.2d 214]
traffic checkpoint even though probable
(1984), "[t]his Court repeatedly has accause is not required to stop the^vehicle.
knowledged the difficulties created for
In the same vein, the Court held in Almeicourts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc,
da-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
case-by-case definition of Fourth Amend273, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L.Ed.2d 596
ment standards to be applied in differing
0973), that a roving unit of the border
factual circumstances." Even if I did
patrol must have probable cause to search
not disagree with the plurality as to what
vehicles in the vicinity of the border. See
result the proper legal standard should
also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94-96,
produce in the case before us, I would
100 S.Ct. 338, 343-4^, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979)
object to the formulation of a standard
(rejecting argument that reasonable suspiso devoid of content that it produces
cion justifies search of a person detained
rather than eliminates uncertainty in this
on premises during execution of warrant to
field.
search premises); Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 65-66, 88 S.Ct. 1889,1904, 20 L.Ed.
2d 917 (1968) (reaching into suspect's pock9. As Professor Amsterdam noted:

107 S.Ct at 1504-05 (Scalia, J., concurring).9
The varieties of police behavior and of the
occasions that call it forth are so innumerable
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We appreciate the government's concern
about excessive constitutional restrictions
on police conduct We must echo, however, the Supreme Court's recent reminder
in Hicks:
[TJhere is nothing new in the realization
that the Constitution sometimes insulates
the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us a l l — [W]e
choose to adhere to the textual and traditional standard of probable cause.
Hicks, 107 S.Ct. at 1155. With this admonition in mind, we refuse the government's
invitation to decide this case by balancing
the competing interests at stake. Instead,
we adhere to the bright-line rule that Hicks
appears to have announced: The Fourth
Amendmer^ prohibits searches of dwelling^
without ptobable cause.
[9] We also reject the government's argument, raised for the first time in its
supplemental brief filed after en banc argument, that the fruits of the warrantless
search should be admissible in evidence
because the police conducted the search in
good faith. See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677
(1984). The Supreme Court has applied the
so-called "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule only to searches conducted
in good faith reliance on a warrant or a
statute later declared to be unconstitutional. See Illinois t>. Krull, — U.S.
,
107 S.Ct 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). We
decline to extend Leon's good faith exception to searches not conductedvin reliance
on a warrant or a statute. See United
States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698-99
(9th Cir.1986) (refusing to apply Leon exception to search conducted in reliance on
regulations later determined not to authorize the search at issue).
The district coiurt's order denying Winsor's motion to suppress is REVERSED.
The panel opinion and the judgment of
conviction are VACATED and the case is
REMANDED to the district court for furthat their reflection in a general sliding scale
approach could only produce more slide than
scale— IJ4 there are no fairly clear rules
telling the policeman what he may and may
not do, covrts are seldom going to say that
what he din was unreasonable. The ultimate

ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FARRIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I.
The threshold issue, as the majority acknowledges, is whether the police conducted a search when Dennis Winsor opened
the door and exposed his face to the officers. No search occurred if Winsor voluntarily opened the door. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct 507, 511,
19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Whether Winsor
voluntarily opened the door is a question of
fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct
2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. Bitter, 752 F.2d 435, 439 (9th
Cir.1985). The district court never made a
finding on the issue because it justified the
police conduct on the basis of (1) the "hot
pursuit" doctrine, and (2) the hotel manager's consent to search the rooms. Although I agree that the grounds upon
which the district court relied were improper, the case must be remanded to the district court for findings on the issue of
voluntariness. Because the majority chooses not to remand, but to engage in fact
finding as a necessary step in reversing a
criminal conviction, I dissent
In the order denying Steven Winsor's
motion to suppress, the district court found
that
In any event, there was no search of
Room 213 which would implicate Steven
Dale Winsor's Fourth Amendment interests. The police officers had the manager's permission to look through each
room of the hotel, and indeed had been
supplied a pass key for that purpose.
All the police did when they arrived outr
side room 213 was to knock, announce
themselves, and demand that the occupants open the door. Dennis Winsor
conclusion is that 'the people would be 'secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects/
only in the discretion of the police/
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.LRev. 349, 393-94 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
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opened the door on command. This does
not constitute a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Excerpt of Record at 84-85.
On the basis of these findings, the threejudge panel that originally reviewed this
case assumed that Dennis Winsor had involuntarily opened the door. The majority
now purportedly "agrees" with the panel's
assumption that the door was opened involuntarily:
We reject the government's further argument that any search that may have
occurred can be sustained on the basis of
consent because Dennis Winsor "voluntarily" opened the door. Appellee's Brief
at 23. We agree with the original panel,
that "[compliance with/a police 'demand'/
is not consent" 816 F.2d at 1397. Accord Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92,
20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).
Majority Op. at 1573 n. 3.
The majority cannot "agree" with the
panel's assumption that Dennis Winsor involuntarily opened the door. The panel's
assumption was not pivotal to the decision—the panel ultimately affirmed Steven
Winsor's conviction and avoided the needless gesture of remanding the case for
findings on the issue of voluntariness.
Here, however, the majority's finding on
voluntariness is pivotal. Winsor's conviction can only be reversed if the majority
finds that Dennis Winsor involuntarily
opened the door. Fact finding lender these
circumstances is never appropriate for an
appellate court.
The majority denies that it engages in
fact finding. It argues that the court can
decide the voluntariness issue as a matter
of law because the essential facts are not
in dispute. Majority Op. at 1573 n. 3.
None of the cases relied upon by the majority, however, support the novel proposition
that voluntariness can be found as a matter
of larw. In Bumper and Al-Azzavry, the
trial courts made findings of fact on the
issue of voluntariness. The appellate
courts decidecfonly whether the trial courts
had clearly erred in making their findings.
See Bumpe% 391 U.S. at 547-50, 88 S.Ct.

at 1791-92 and Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d at
894-95. In Johnson, the government never argued that the defendant consented to
the search, but that the search was proper
as an incident to a valid arrest. 333 U.S. at
13, 68 S.Ct. at 368. The government apparently conceded that the search was not
voluntary. In Amos, the government argued the consent issue, but the opinion
does not indicate whether the trial court
made findings on the issue. 255 U.S. at
315, 317, 41 S.Ct at 267, 268. Even if
Amos had stated that voluntariness could
be found as a matter of law—which it did
not—Amos was decided in 1921 and would
no longer be good law in light of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct
2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the leading
case in the area. Schneckloth expressly
held that voluntariness is a question of
fact' Id. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct at 2058-59.
The majority also engages in sleight of
hand when it says that the essential facts
are not in dispute. Certain facts are relevant to the ultimate determination of the
voluntariness issue, but the essential fact
question is whether Dennis Winsor voluntarily opened the door. As the majority
recognizes, that issue is in dispute. The
district court never made a finding on the
issue because it relied on other grounds to
justify the police conduct. The district
court did state that the police demanded
that the occupants open the door and that
Dennis Winsor opened the door on command, but these "findings" were not made
for purposes of deciding the voluntariness
issue. Had the district court addressed
that issue, it would have necessarily considered the totality of circumstances before
making a finding on the voluntariness issue. Id.
The totality of the circumstances included more than the fact that the police made
a demand and that Dennis Winsor opened
the door on command. The Winsors must
have known, for example, that they could
not escape from the hotel. Police had the
building surrounded, and a helicopter hovered above the two-story structure. The
police were in the hallway making a roomby-room inquiry. The district court found
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that "Dennis Winsor was at that very time
destroying the evidence by altering his appearance, hiding the clothing in which he
committed the robbery and flushing other
evidence of the robbery down the toilet"
Excerpt of Record at 84. Whether it is a
reasonable inference from the facts that
Dennis Winsor, in his altered appearance,
opened the door voluntarily in an attempt
to deceive the police so that they would
move on to the next room is a question for
the trier of fact I would remand to the
trial court for a factual determination of
the issue.

required the police to wait until they could
pinpoint the room in which the suspect
could be hiding. The suspect knew that he
was trapped, however, and he posed a
grave danger to the occupants of the hotel
and to the policemen pursuing him. Under
these circumstances, I would hold that the
police, in requiring Winsor to open the
door, effected a reasonable search.
BEEZER, Circuit Judge, concurs in
Section I but does not join in Section
II.

ALARCON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
II.
I respectfully dissent
Officer Errol Bowser of the Los Angeles
Even if this court could properly find
that Dennis Winsor involuntarily opened Police Department observed Dennis Winsor
the door, I would uphold the searchv Ari- run out of a bank which had just been
zona tv. Hicks, — U.S.
, 107 S.Ct robbed. Officer Bowser pursued Dennis
1149? 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), does not hold ' Winsor to the Chesterfield Hotel. Other
that dwelling place searches and seizures law enforcement units were called upon to
always require probable cause. The Court assist in capturing the bank robber, and
indicated that searches and seizures of they arrived within minutes. A police helidwelling places, although based on less copter circled overhead during the manthan probable cause, can be reasonable if hunt
they are minimally intrusive and operationThe officers determined that an immedially necessary. Id 107 S.Ct at 1154. The ate search of the hotel for the bank robber
Court never had to decide whether the was necessary. The officers were aware
search in Hicks qualified for this exception that at the time of the bank robbery Dennis
to the probable cause requirement because Winsor claimed that he was armed and
the government never argued that the appeared to be carrying a firearm in his
search was operationally necessary. Id. pocket The officers knocked on a number
In the case before us, however, the of doors before arriving at Winsor's room.
search was minimally intrusive and opera- They knocked and said, "Police, open the
tionally necessary. The police had a dan- door." The door was partially opened by
gerous and purportedly armed bank rob- Dennis Winsor. The police immediately
bery suspect trapped in a'hotel. They did recognized him as the person who had run
not have probable cause to believe that the from the scene of the bank robbery to the
suspect was in any particular room but hotel, notwithstanding the fact that Winsor
they knew that he was secreting himself in had attempted to alter his appearance by
one of the rooms of the two-story hotel. shaving his moustache. After making this
The search of the Winsors' room was mini- identification, the police pushed open the
mally intrusive because the police required door to the hotel room, at which time they
only that thfe Winsors open the door to the saw Steven Winsor.
room. The search was operationally necesThe district court concluded from these
sary because there was no practicable facts that the request that the door be
mfclns for the police to discover where the opened was reasonable and that the offisuspect was hiding.
cers' conduct fell within the "hot pursuit"
The police could have waited indefinitely, exception to the Fourth Amendment's reas the majority would have them do, until quirement that law enforcement officers
probable* cause arose. This would have obtain a warrant based on probable cause
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prior to intruding into the privacy of a
dwelling house. I would affirm the denial
of the motion to suppress Steven Winsor's
incriminating statements and the physical
evidence found within the room after the
entry. What the majority characterizes as
a "visual entry" into the partially opened
doorway was lawful under the "hot pursuit" exception to the Fourth Amendment,
as defined by the Supreme Court in Warden v.*Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct 1642,
18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).

and the placement of government observers on fishing vessels to protect sea mammals (Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 476 U.S.
1252,104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984)).
None of these cases, however, concern the
issue presented by the facts before us,
namely, may officers acting in hot pursuit
of a bank robber enter a residential building to arrest him. The Supreme Court
answered this question affirmatively twenty-two years ago in Warden v. Hayden, on
facts less compelling than the emergency
that faced the officers in the instant matter.

The majority has reversed the denial of
the motion to suppress without citing, discussing or attempting to distinguish the
decisions of the United States Supreme
In Warden, "[t]he police were informed
Court that have recognized that where law
' that a robbery had taken place, and that
enforcement officers have probable cause
the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa Lane
to believe t^p a suspect has committed a
less than five minutes before they reached
felony, thejf may enter a residential building without a warrant if they have pursued it" $87 U.S. at 298, 87 S.Ct at 1646.
the suspect from the scene of the crime. Upon these facts, the Supreme Court held
Instead, the majority has devoted its ener- that the officers:
gies to an exhaustive analysis of inapposite 4 acted reasonably when they entered the
house .and began to search for a man of
cases involving the cursory search of a
the description they had been given
physical object within a private residence*
The Fourth Amendment does not require
where the officers had a lawful right to be
police officers to delay in the course of
(Arizona i>. Hicks, — U.S.
, 107 S.Ct.
an investigation if to do so would gravely
1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)), consent to
endanger their lives or the lives of othsearch by a hotel manager (Stoner v. Caliers.
fornia, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct 889, 11 L.Ed.
2d 856 (1964)), the "stop and frisk" excep- Id. at 299, 87 S.Ct at 1646. The Court held
tion to the probable cause requirement of further that "neither the entry without
the Fourth Amendment (Terry v. Ohio, 392 warrant to search for the robber, nor the
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 search for him without warrant was inval(1968)), the transportation of a person to a id." Id. at 298, 87 S.Ct at 1645.
police station in the absence of probable
In the matter before this court, a police
cause that he has committed a crime (Dunofficer observed Dennis Winsor running
away v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct
from a bank he had just robbed. The offi2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)), the search of
cer pursued him to the hotel where the
a pervasively regulated industry (United
arrest occurred. Thus, unlike in Warden,
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct
the police here pursued the fleeing felon,
1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972)), the search of a
without interruption from the scene of the
car trunk (Cady v. pombrowski, 413 U.S.
crime to the residence in which he attempt433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)),
ed to hide.
the inventory search of a car (South Dakota v. Opppman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct
In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.
3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)), customs 38, 96 S.Ct 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975), the
searches (United States v. Villamonte- Supreme Court applied the hot pursuit docMarquez, 462 U.S, 579, 103 S.Ct 2573, 77 trine in a narcotics case wherein the susL.Ed.2d 22 (1983}), body cavity searches pect ran into a residential building to avoid
(Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60, 99 arrest. The Court summarized the hot p\u>
S.Ct 1861, 1884-4&5, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)), suit rule as follows:
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In Warden v. Hatfden, 387 U.S. 294 [8? fact, in Hicks, the officers had lawfully
S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782] (1967), we entered a private residence to investigate
recognized the right of police, who had the source of gunfire. Id. 107 S.Ct at
probable cause to believe an armed rob- 1152. The very narrow question at issue in
ber had entered a house a few minutes Hicks was whether the slight movement of
before, to make a warrantless entry to a turntable in plain view to permit the
arrest the robber and to search for weap- reading of its serial number was a search.
ons.
The majority in Hicks concluded that this
Id. at 42, 96 S.Ct at 2409. In the matter "cursory inspection" was a search. Id.
sub judice, it is undisputed that the offi* The Court declined to create a distinction
» cers had probable cause to believe that between a "cursory inspection" and a "full
Dennis Winsor entered the hotel with a blown search" of a physical object located
concealed weapon after robbing a bank. within a private residence. Id. The majorIt should be noted that while the police in ity has failed to explain how this "brightWarden had probable cause to believe the line test" is applicable to the entry of a
bank robber was armed based on informa- residence by law enforcement officers in
tion from an informant, in Santana there hot pursuit of a bank robber. Because the
was no evidence that the defendant was lawfulness of the entry was not at issue in
armerf at the time she ran into the resi- Hicks, the Supreme Court had no occasion
dence. Thus, in Santana, the Supreme to discuss or even mention the "hot purCourt extended the hot pursuit doctrine to > suit" ruJe set forth in Warden.
a felony arrest in a residence where there
The majority in the matter before this
was no indication that the suspect was arm- court appears to assume that in Hicks, the
ed. Accordingly, whether Dennis Winsor Supreme Court overruled the "hot pursuit"
was in fact armed at the time he was exception sub silentio. I find no statement
pursued to his residence is immaterial to in the Hicks opinion that supports such an
the application of the hot pursuit doctrine. astonishing interpretation.
In 1983, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its adherence to the hot pursuit doctrine
withx respect to warrantless felony arrests
in residences, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 750, 104 S.Ct 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d
732 (1983), but refused to apply this exception to an entry to make an arrest for a
minor offense, id. at 754,104 S.Ct at 2100.
In Welsh, the defendant, was arrested for
driving while intoxicated, "a noncriminal,
civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.,, Id
As noted above, the majority has failed
to explain why Warden and Santana do
not compel us to uphold the district court's
denial of the motion to suppress. Instead,
relying onl Hicks, the majority appears to
hold that officers who have pursued a rob, ^ r from the bank to a hotel may not make
t "visual entry" into his doorway without
probable cause. The majority's reliance on
Hicks is curious. Neither "visual entry"
without a warrant nor the "hot pursuit"
exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirements was discussed in Hicks. In

I would uphold the district court's order
denying Steven Winsor's motion to suppress. In 1966, the Supreme Court instructed us in Warden that the police may
enter a residential building to make a warrantless arrest if they are in hot pursuit of
an armed robber. In Warden, the police
relied on information provided by a third
party that an armed robber had entered a
residence a few minutes before they arrived. The Supreme Court found that this
showing was sufficient to justify a physical
entry to search for the suspect. In this
matter, the bank ro66er was pursued from
the bank to the hotel by a policeman.
Thus, the arresting officers did not rely on
hearsay statements as in Warden. Probable cause was established here by the testimony of a percipient police officer. Because Warden authorized a physical entry
into Dennis Winsor's apartment under
these circumstances, a fortiori, the officers' "visual entry" was lawful.
The lawfulness of the entry to arrest a
bank robber in a residence, because of the
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hot pursuit doctrine, makes it unnecessary
for us to address the issues discussed by
the majority, that is, the distinctions, if
any, between visual entry and physical entry, between a cursory inspection and a
full-blown search of a physical object, or
whether Dennis Winsor consented to the
opening of the door. I must dissent because I believe that the restrictions placed
on law enforcement officers in this case by
the majority are unrealistic, unreasonable

and could be life-threatening in future
cases where officers pursue felons to residential buildings.

APPENDIX 4
Search Warrant and Affidavit

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, S.-iLT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IX AND FOR SALT LAKE CCUNTi, sTATZ Or UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, -TATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the Sta:.e of Utah.
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before
Detective Steve Willden
. I an; satisfied that there i:
probable cause to believe
That

( ) on the person!s) of
(

in tne venicie*si cl-scri oeu as

(Xi on the premises kno.-.n as 1335 South &J0 Ease, a gra;
stucco, single: family, resxd-nce, with the number- ciea:i> mark-:
i t.

Jait Lakt
r.ne city or
, county or sa_ t i-aKe . otate
Utah, there ia now certain property or evidence described as:
Marijuana, scales, packaging materials, paraphernalia, uocumer.ts
pertaining to or showing: r^bidr.ice, proceeds of narcotic
trafficking, disposition of narcotic trafficking proceeds,
distribution of a controiitrd substance, and U.S. Currency,

and that said property or evidence:
(X; was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, o
(X) has been used to commit or ccnceal a public offensr.
(X; is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a ;-.*•
•wf cortt.it ting or concealing a public <..ff~r.se, or
iX; consists of a:; : tt-m or constitutes evid^r:<:e -.-f il"--;

PAGE 2
SEARCH WARRANT
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED;
( i in the day r.tme
(X* at any Lime day or night * good cuuse ka\ ink" been tiiouni
( ,• to execute without notice of authority or purpose, ; proof
under oath beina shown that the object or* thi* search aiajbe quickly destroyed *..r disposed of or that harm ma.result to any person if notice were given;
to ~ake a search cf the above-named or described personls),
vehicle!**), and premises for tae here i:i-ab ;ve describee property or
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it
forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to
the order of this court.
GIVtN t'XDES MY HA\*D and dated this

2- day ci- J ^ £ i ^ V . n%

IN THi£ THIRD
IS

CIRLLIT

COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

AND FOR SALT LAKE COLNTi', STATE Or UTAH

STAiE OF LTAK

)

County of Salt Lake

)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

/>»<~t j <

BEFORE:

JID'^E

450 South 2nd East
ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn,

deposes and says:

That he has reason to believe
That

\

) on the person!s) of

t ) in the vehicle!s) described as
(X) on the premises known as 1335 South 300 East, a gray
stucco, single family, residence, with the numbers clear!'-" marked or.
it.
In the City of
5^\LT_ LAKE
, County -.jf Salt Lake, 3t-te of
Utah. ~':\eve is ncu certain property or evidence described as:
Marijuana, scales? packagin* irateriais, paraphernalia, doc ji;;e::*.s
pertaining to or shoeing: residence, proceeds of narcotic
trafficking, disposition of narcotic trafficking proceeds,
distribution of a controlled substance, and U.S. currency.
and rh.ir said property or evidence:
(\i WHi ur. .a'..fully ac'iua^ci or Is unia'. i'ul^y p-..is •»•-?-: *•=•• . L :
(X) has b*ren used ;o e coin; it or conceal >.-. p...;bi_c off^iibe. ;:
i\)
is being possessed with the purp^s^ to use ii as z. r.:eri-..vr
of con:nii tting or cunceaiing a public offense, i-r
(X) consists of an item or constitutes e\ idence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or
( ) consists of an item or constitute* evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct. ..'Note requirements of Utah C-.-de
Annota; ed , ~ 7-2 '-"-3 ( 2 ) ]
Affia.:t br.-iieves t;.e propert> and evidence urs•*. ibed a b ^ e is
:\ice::e of the .:ri::ie,s) of DISTRIBUTION OK A CCNTKOLLED SuBS ^>-CE/
POSSESSION - OF A C0NT30LLKD SUBSTANCE.

PAGE 2
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to estabiibh the irounus for .ssuan:e of a sea:c;i wa; runtare :
Yjur affianc is Detective currently assigned to the MetroNiircoiici Task Force. Vour affiant has been a police officer f^r ten
years and experience in narcotics investigation for over two .-ears.
Your affiant has received Training in narcotics trafficking fro:a
J E A , Department of. Justice, FBI, and numerous seminars.
On December 2nd, 1991, Detective Kevin Judd was contacted by v.n
anonymous maie who stated that at it»35 Suut:: Sou East, a gray h^.uSr,
there was an individual named Steve, who was involved in the bale of
large quantities of marijuana. Detect i'. e Judd asked this anon* -mo us
individual how much was a large quantit:- . This individual stated
that Steve was holding one hundred pounds of marijuana at this tirue.
This individual would not identify himself, and hung up at this tim*;.
On December 2nd, 1S91, Detective Judd and your affiant went :.o
1935 South 900 East, the address sought to be searched. Con;act was
made at the residence with an individual who identified himself as
3" eve Rogers. Rogers was very ner.ous. Rogers denied your affiants
request to come into the residence and speak to him. Rogers did
agree to obtain identification from within the residence. As hogers
opened the door, an odor of marijuana could be bmeilec comin* frj.;i
the residence. Entry was then made into the residence, a no Rogers
was advised that we could smell the marijuana, and was agai:. nsk-rd
for consent. Rogers* requested a search warrant. At which tin;-, he
was detained and your affiant left ti.e residence, which wab secured
by other members of the Metro-N'arcctijs Task Force.
Your affiant has smeiiel marijuana on numeious ether occas .:.-iis •
and knows from his experience and training what marijuana smell*
like. Your affiant believes from the information reoe.ve; froc. the
anonynous c.tizen and from the smell of marijuana within uhe
residence, that marijuana will be found within tne residence sji.ght
to be searched.
You.* affiant lb an experienced :.oiice officer and :.:•;: t hnt
experience knew that scales, paehag.nu r:aterluis? paraphernal- a,
documents pertaining to or sho^im.: i s*-d.--r:c-*, proceeds of r.arc. i ic
trafficking, disposition of narcotic trv f f ic.-.ir.g proceeds,
distribution of a controlled substance, arte I'.S. currency are founc
where narcotic trafficking is taking place.
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Ycur atiiant considers tht; L:\ foi mation rece.-ea fr->m t::- c:::f iaeiitial
informant reiiabie because (if any information is ootained frc-?» an
unnamed source!
The anonvmous citizen contacted the >:eLro->'.-irccti:s Scr-kc Force o;.
his own free will. He is nor. a paid inforir.ar.:, or is
>rki::g off
any type of criminal charges. Your affiant knows m ; leaser: for the
anonymous indi\ iduai tu have calied with faisr: info: million concerning
rhe distribution of marijuana, ir.-.'m the reside::c»r sought tc be
searched.
i2

*"* *i»

Your affiant, has verified the above inf crinat iun frcr. the confident iai
informant to be correct and accurate through ihe following
independent inves t igation:

VKEREFORE, t.he affiant prays that a Search W.-irrant oe issued for U:e
seizure of said ite^s:
\ J i n c n e aa*. t i m e .
, X; a t a n y t i m e da;, c : n i g h t b ^ C a U i - t h e r e - i s r e a s - . n t o
b e l i e ' - e i t i s n e - e s » a r y u sei.*:e t h e p r c p e ; t y p r i .>r t o :. t
be.lr.s4* c o n c e a l e d , d . c s ' r o * * e i , t;a;r.a-*e<. • ..»r a i t e r e - J , o r _'oio t h e r gjcd reas;r;,^
-w. t :
*s cur .vent-:- nig it t i m e ,

L ei :g se ,?u.*e<: Yo...r affitnt see .s Z . J
i n e resjici^nct* . s c u r r e n t .
.* light
serve the warrant immediate! v rather t*.an wait uati- th
affiar.t
do**s
net
**ish
Z>
detain
the
resiience
anlo.ia
hours. You
th.in is i.-ecessai-v.

AFFIANT

c

—::—^

Nu.
Tiie oersonai property (listed b*±„o^ / ^et o^:. •->;: cht.* inventor:a'.tacned hereto) was r.aken iron, uie cre-ni -es .u« A'.rG ana aescnbea
as 193." South soC EasL, a ara;- stucjo. si.fi.e . .i::;ii> , res iu.^n; -*i,
uiih the numbers c^-ariy mark'-d or* it.
and from the vehicle! s) described a<*

ana rrcm tne Person;si u:

by virtue o:" a searc:i warrant daf-d the

c .i v c i

U e o e in rj e r «

y * i.

a r:c e v e ? u t e <JL
o:

tne

L.A:vl

i.oove

C 'JL . ' . . i f

OV O

U•;;. = e

rt e e -= e

entitiea

cour*

5 1 A i XL '«.< "

L i Aft

CIRCUIT

.01R7.

IN A;iL* FOR SAL"

^ 1 1 1 JJ e ii
<"h :::: t n i s ^ a r . a n t ' - a s e . e i v t e a
uo swcctr m a t . t r i e a r c a c n e c ; m v e . . t c r y : o n t a i : . - 5 z . r u e a n a
d e t a i i e u a : c o u r . : . of ;*I1 t h e ; - r o r ^ : ^ . y t a i . e n b " ne : .t.id':r t n e ^ i r r a : ;
on
t n e 2nd d a y of Z'-ecember, i. ri b i

A i : of t h e p r o p e r : : v calven by v i r t u e o:' sa;«i w a r r a n t u-i.i be
r e t a i n e d i n my c u s t o d y s u b j e c t
o*.h-*r c o u r t
or things

t c t h e o r d e r o : t h i s c o u r t or or a.iy

in which t h e o i ' f e r . s e

tuk^n,

is

in respect

;o which

the

property

triaole.

i^a—o u o s c r i o e a ar.a £^<o^Lp: zo

;

*-"^V

oeter

I.WENTCRY LIoT

Controlled

Substance:

A oai' c c r . t a i p . _ r z' a o o r o d a a t e i v

ore

. .'una c :

:::ar*.juana.

A bag c o n t a i n i m
mari .iuana.

\ w c o a £ s ** i.. n a o t r c ixn : ; i t e i y cr.e o u n c e

A nag c c n : : a n : n ^
mu->hroon:s .

approximate--

inr«re Ddgs c u n - . a i . ' i i n *
liar, juana.

sever,

appromn.a'

u'ranrs o .

of

;: 3i i o e y : j i a

»o Dour.'.vs of

A baa containing approximate!, one pound of ir.ari.iur-na .
A bag centalni ~u 2 croas-icp?, • -us pev*tec. ainph-. tannines ; .

Paraphernalia:
"CLI"

Scale, >io \: LCD 2 C J 1 .

c.haus icale, : 5 lb. s-r. ie, >lj .: li : s ri\m ; , wit.; v e n o u s
s ize wr-i a:h.ts .
Metai

bj.\, "Oreo Sand*- ich " . w;th se^ds and ^ter.-,

t fix .li.ar pr.one
5 6 0-819 '1'

-

::n ^ ratteries ana cnarger,

.w-;ee i iar.eous ao:uT,e:;ti, re:;-:.:.:, ano pao-f-rH
Pachas':ng materials anc 3 bo:,e.-^ of bags.
Syringe, mirror, and glass vial wit;: wnite
Ohaus triple beam scale.
Ci^ar box witn rrisce iiareous paraphernalia.
Co2 Regulator.

rlreMres :
!a:-1 f - r•'•. d , ::: • a H . : :; 11 , £ v\
, L *:.n;u; our:, o 5:1-."^:.;

iFirearms, continues):
-^C :

12 ?au? f c j,

Six,

biiotsur. r o u n d s ,

(ammunition).

P a g e D.

>kney:

= ID:

s2,520.uu,

Pa*e £.

Para;;her::ai:c:

-IE:

vvnite power

= 2Z:

White

-•:£:

Box c c n ^ a i r i r u :

= -E:

Bex contain.:n£ h*~Grcoa::ic tubing.

= 5£:

Tvv<; b o x e s

-tZ:

i:our
I yJ

-~Z;

L r.

in

l.r.

suppi*

currency.

box K i t h

power s u p p l y

z~"pe

2 i:.r^e

:c:itaini::2

power c o n v e r t e r

attached

lamp.

box.
lamps.

piast.c

ouc.v^ts.

•iectr-cal

devices.

; •

OOA

Two c o w e r

ou^oiies

frlectricai

and

iquipT..-:::

two . a m p s ,

•••it.:

in caribcarc

bo::.

-S-E:

i'v.o e l e c t r i c a l

-cr.vertt-rs.

=iZ:

Celiuiar

c.v.uie

in s r ; r :

= 101:

Xunwrous

i:-rT^

l-el .>r.-i.vz

pack.
: o hvdror-ho.ii--.-

^vsr.em

